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Summary findings
The stimulation of private saving is essential to both  alternative financial instruments, including foreign
stabilization and structural adjustment in the transition  currency, "trust company" shares, and private loans. The
economies.  financial sector has reacted slowly to this change, but the
Private saving in these countries has declined sharply  most successful commercial banks have recognized the
since independence, and this decline has been a factor in  change in demand for financial instruments and have
the onset of extreme inflation because governments have  accommodated the savers. The state commercial banks
resorted to an inflation tax to finance deficit spending.  - especially the successor to the Soviet Saving Bank -
Conway examines evidence on spending in Belarus,  have been slow to adjust to the new environment.  As a
Georgia, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine. He examines  result, the near-monopoly that bank once held on
decisions about whether to save, and in which specific  deposits has been rapidly eroded.
financial or real instruments. He summarizes the  Government methods for mobilizing funds must
evolution of financial sectors in these countries to  change, contends Conway. Governments are not
provide a history of the success or failure of financial  typically prepared to borrow savings from these new
institutions to intermediate between private savers and  instruments, since they are denominated in foreign
the government as borrower.  currency or are offered only at positive real interest
He concludes that private saving has indeed declined  rates. That attitude must change if governments are to
since independence, but less than is indicated by banking-  make needed investments in infrastructure and to avoid
system statistics. Concurrent  with this downturn  has been  creating inflationary credit.
a shifting of financial assets from bank deposits to
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Executive  Summary
Encouragement  of private saving is a central feature  of economic  success for the transition
economies  in both the short run and the long run.  The transition  economies  are those former
republics of the Soviet Union that are introducing  the infrastructure  for market activity into the
economic  environment. In the short run these economies  have been characterized  by extreme
inflation  and are implementing  stabilization  programs: the current burden of these programs will be
less onerous on the citizens  if the government  can finance  part of its expenditures  through private
saving.  In the long run, private saving will be the precondition  for the investment  necessary  to
introduce technological  improvements  into the production  processes  of these countries. Stimulating
private saving is thus a sine qua non of both stabilization  and structural  adjustment.
Private saving has unfortunately  declined  sharply in the period since independence  for these
countries. This decline  has itself been a factor in the onset of extreme  inflation, since as private
saving was reduced  the governments  resorted  to the inflation  tax to finance  deficitary  spending. In
this research report I summarize  the available  evidence  on saving from four of these countries:
Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan  and Ukraine. I examine  the saving decision as well as the related
decision  to place the saving in specific  financial  or real instruments. I also summnarize  the evolution
of the financial  sectors of these countries to provide a history of the success  (or failure) of financial
institutions  to intermediate  between  private savers and the government  as a dominant borrower.
I conclude  that private saving has indeed  declined  in the period since independence,  but to a
lesser extent than is indicated  by examination  of banking-system  statistics. There has concurrently
with this downturn  been a shifting  of financial  assets from banking deposits  to alternative  financial
instruments, including  foreign currency, "trust company"  shares and individual  lending. The financial
sector has reacted  slowly to this change, but the most successful  commercial  banks have been those
that recognized  this change in demand  for financial  instruments  and have accommodated  the savers
with appropriate  instruments. The state commercial  banks, and especially  the successor  bank to the
Soviet Saving Bank, have been quite slow in adjusting  to this new environment. As a result, the
near-monopoly  that this bank once  held on deposits has been eroded rapidly.
This shift in financial  instruments  for saving implies a shift in government  methods for
mobilizing  these funds. The government  is typically  not prepared to borrow the saving in these new
instruments,  since it is denominated  in foreign  currency or is only offered at positive real interest
rate.  This attitude  must change if the governments  are to avoid inflationary  credit creation  and to
make the necessary  infrastructural  investments  for the future.
This report has three novel components. There is a dynamic  theory of saving for transition
economies  that is not found elsewhere. There is a sumnmary  of original surveys  conducted  in Georgia
and Kazakhstan  (with greater detail in Conway (1994b))  to determine  the degree of household  saving.
There is also a summary  of macroeconomic  statistics  on saving in the financial  system that has not
been pulled together elsewhere. The text of the report provides a summary  of results, while greater
detail can be found in the Annexes  and in the earlier report "Saving  Mobilization  in Transition
Economies". An annex of detailed  financial  information  from specific  financial  institutions  has been
excluded  from this published  version, but can be obtained  from the author.Saving in Transi*zon  Economids - 4
I.  Definition  of saving.
Private saving is at the center of both present and future concerns  for the economies  of the
former Soviet Union. Stabilization  programs currently in place are contingent  on sufficient  private
saving to offset continued  public sector borrowing  requirements. Projections  for future economic
growth are contingent  upon a strong private saving and investment  response  to the planned cutbacks
in public investment.  Despite its centrality, there has been no attention  paid to the motivations  and
incentives  to private saving in these economies  in current economic  research. I provide an analytical
and empirical  examination  of the macroeconomic  characteristics  of private saving behavior in
transition economies  in this research  project.  The analysis  is new, in that it addresses  the specific
features of the transition process; the empirical evidence  on the pattern of saving observed in Belarus,
Georgia, Kazakhstan  and Ukraine is new as well.
The theory of saving.
Saving behavior has received  extensive attention  in the theoretical  and empirical  economic
literature. However, this literature has paid little attention  to the dynamic evolution  of saving,
especially  when beginning  from disequilibrium. There has also been little attention  to the specific
incentives  to private saving in transitional  economies  due to the inherited  Soviet financial  institutions
and markets. These two features are crucial to the proper understanding  of present saving behavior in
the economies  of the former Soviet Union.
In the following  sections  I provide an overview  of the theory of private saving. For those
parts that are original to this report, I provide mathematical  restatement  in Annex A.
Previous  literature.
The determinants  of saving have been examined  extensively  in the literature  both for
developed  and developing  countries.'  Most recent analyses  recognize  the intertemporal  nature of the
saving decision  and begin with the life-cycle  or permanent-income  hypothesis  (Giovannini  (1985), Fry
(1988), Campbell  (1987), Ostry and Reinhart (1992)). Desired saving (or its "residual",  desired
consumption)  is derived from an Euler equation defining  the evolution  of saving over time.  In theory
such saving is positively related to the real interest rate through both wealth and substitution  effects,
and positively related  to increases in real wealth. These analyses  are missing, however, the evolution
of private saving out of the steady-state  equilibrium. 2
The importance  of the real interest rate in the determination  of saving was also debated in the
literature on financial  deepening. McKinnon  (1973) introduced  the notion  that economies  with "deep"
financial  markets -- those providing  financial  instruments  that attracted  substantial  saving flows into
the formal financial sector -- would have more impressive  economic  growth than those that did not.
1  Most macroeconomic  textbooks  devote a chapter  to the various theories  of the consumption
function; for given levels of income and tax liabilities,  this becomes  a theory  of saving as well.
Blanchard  and Fischer (1989)  provides an overview  of life-cycle  theories of saving.  Smith (1990)  is
a recent review  with empirical evidence  for advanced  countries.
2  Campbell  (1987)  does consider  such adjustments  in an error-correction  framework,  but it takes
the real interest rate as exogenous  and unchanging  in its analysis.Saung in Transition  Eonomies  - 5
McKinnon  saw positive real interest rates as the most direct method  to encourage  financial  deepening.
The concurrent  increase in saving and reduction  in the relative price of present consumption  derived
in the following  models illustrate  this point, although  the real interest rate is properly endogenous.
Van Wijnbergen  (1983) and Buffie  (1984)  demonstrate  one channel for that endogeneity: government
policies that artificially  limit interest rate in the formal sector will encourage  the growth of informal
sector intermediaries.
In the former  Soviet Union.
These analyses  are suggestive,  but do not provide  a satisfactory  framework  for research in the
former Soviet Union.  Despite  the liberalization  of prices and partial decontrol of financial-sector
institutions, substantial  institutional  rigidities remain. These can either block directly the market
outcome  or provide undesirable  incentives  to savers and intermediaries. Further, an appropriate
theoretical  structure for this study must be one which allows the tracking of stocks and flows of
domestic financial  assets so that the "ruble overhang"  phenomenon  can be explained  simulateously
with the continuation  of saving.
Empirical investigation  of private saving behavior in these formal institutions  must
acknowledge  that the observed  quantities  do not correspond  to equilibrium  at market-clearing  interest
rate.  Cottarelli and Blejer (1992)  provide  estimates  of the ruble overhang  using an appropriate
methodology  for the period 1986-1990,  and conclude  that it was a substantial  phenomenon  during the
period.  This analysis  was not carried forward into the period of independence.
The Soviet financial  system was historically  one of private saving and government  dissaving.
The government  did not cover all investment  expenditure  from taxation, and the financial  sector
intermediated  to ensure that private saving was made available  to finance the excess.  Nominal
interest rates on this were fixed. 3 Private saving includes  both household  saving and private
enterprise saving. Private enterprises  have historically  been a minor source of saving, although  the
evolution  of this mix of sources of private saving is an important  part of this study.
A key feature of the Soviet  system in its final years was the existence  of "forced  saving".
The unavailability  of goods at the prices fixed by the state led to currency holdings and financial
deposits in excess of what the private sector  would have chosen at those prices.  This forced saving
accumulated  in the financial  institutions  as deposits and under mattresses  as currency, and grew to
such proportions that it was tagged the "ruble overhang"  (e.g., Nordhaus  (1990)). It represented  an
accumulation  of purchasing  power by the population  that was to be redeemed  for future production.
Financial  deepening  as commonly  measured  was quite advanced  in the republics  of the Soviet
Union in the years preceding  its dissolution;  for example,  household  saving deposits in 1989 were
36.2 percent of GNP while a comparable  figure in the US was 33.7 percent. 4 Interest rates were low
3  Especially  in later years government  excess expenditure  exceeded  private saving.  In the
absence  of a flexible  nominal interest rate this led to central-bank  acceptance  of government  debt.
The consequent  inflationary  pressure was suppressed  by the fixed-price  market mechanism.
'  The Soviet figure is drawn from McKinnon  (1991, p. 121). The US figure is taken from the
Economic  Report to the President 1992. Household  saving is the total of demand  deposits, other
checkable  deposits, money  market funds and saving deposits (Table B-66)  and is divided  by GDP.Saving In Transtion Economfis  - 6
in nominal  terms, but inflation  was repressed  to even lower levels. Further, measured  financial
deepening  did not necessarily  reflect desired holdings  of financial  assets because  of the forced nature
of saving. Although  the Soviet  government  achieved  one benefit of financial  deepening  - channeling
of saving - it did not achieve  the efficiency  of investment  because  of the command  nature of the
investment  process.5
A second feature of the former Soviet  economy is important  in the comprehension  of the
quantity of deposit  holdings  - the evolution  of prices and inflation. The usual solution  from the
research  on "fix-price"  equilibria  is to specify a separate dynamic  that translates excess  demand into
price increases. As Conway  and Gelb (1988) illustrate, the evolution  of the nominal commodity  price
can be modeled as a sluggish  tatonnement  process in the goods  market.  Immediate  price adjustment
to eliminate  excess demands  is a limiting case of this more general specification.
A theoretical  specification  of saving in the transition.
The theory of private saving is best viewed as an intertemporal  choice for the allocation  of
real resources.  In this section  I begin with a two-period  model to illuminate  the basic economic
forces determining  private saving. I then turn to an extension  of the framework  in which the dynamic
of transition is explicitly  derived.
The two-period  model.
The private sector will be modeled as equating  the present value of expenditure  over the two
periods to the present  value of after-tax income and the wealth carried forward from the past.  The
present  value of after-tax  income includes  income in both periods, with period-one  income subject  to
a production  shock (represented  by ca). The material balance  in the period-one  consumption  good is
then
c'  +  g -y'(a)=(p)  (1)
The government  has its own expenditures  (g) in period one that are not necessarily  financed
completely  out of taxation  receipts and contribute  nothing  to utility.  A is the volume  of international
borrowing  (i.e., the negative  of the current account surplus)  undertaken  by the households. The
relative  price of period-one  goods is denoted  p; it can also be thought  of as the real interest rate
relevant  to saving decisions. 6 International  lenders are assumed  to have a positive  p-elasticity  of
international  borrowing, with the volume of available  financing  rising with p. 7
This understates  financial  deepening in the US in that equity  holdings are ignored.
5  Conway  and Gelb (1988)  concluded  similarly for Algeria -- saving rates were astronomically
high, but the subsequent  investment  had very low returns in terms of output.
6  The relative  price p is defined as P'(1+r)/P2, with P' the price of goods in period i and (l+r)
the relevant  nominal discount  or interest rate to intertemporal  substitution.
'  Rising p indicates  that the real interest rate that the home country  pays on international  debt is
rising.  This specification  was chosen to provide a parameterization  of two extreme  cases: an
economy  with unlimited  access  to world capital markets at given price p' (infinite  p-elasticity)  and an
economy  with no access  to world capital markets (zero p-elasticity). Those special cases are derivedSaving in Transidon  Economis  - 7
Saving of the households in period one is defined as
S =  y'(CI)  - c'  - T  (2)
and as combination of (1) and (2) indicates is identical in equilibrium to the difference of the
government budget deficit (g-r, with T denoting tax revenues) and foreign borrowing ,6.  There  are
thus three sets of determinants  to real saving.  The first is the government fiscal policy, as
summarized by the fiscal deficit.  The second comprises shocks to earnings capacity, as indicated by
the shock a  to period-one product.  The third  is the relative price p.  While the first two are
exogenous, the third is jointly determined with real saving; I examine this joint determination in the
following sections.
Consider the illustration of two-period equilibrium in Figure  1.  I illustrate three equilibria
corresponding to three  p-elasticities of foreign borrowing.  The indifference curves u.,  u'  and u(p)
correspond to three different  cases.  At equilibrium A the volume of foreign borrowing  is fixed at  B.
Given y'  and g, then,  cl is fixed as well.  The domestic real interest rate p adjusts to equilibrate
period-one and period-two consumption demands, and is given by the (negative of the) slope of the
indifference curve u. passing through A. 8 It is higher than the international real interest rate pe,
indicating that the economy will borrow more if given the opportunity at the real interest rate p-.  At
equilibrium B the economy is given the opportunity to borrow unlimited quantities at the rate p-, and
chooses to obtain fl' in this way.  At that quantity of borrowing,  the real interest rate p  is just  equal
to the (negative of the) slope of the indifference curve u-.
In the intermediate case the economy can borrow along the schedule s(p) illustrated  in Figure
1.  It will thus choose a level of foreign borrowing intermediate between ,6. and ,l  at a real interest
rate falling between p0 and p'.  This is illustrated at the point E on indifference curve u(p).  In this
example the greatest amount of saving (equivalently, the lowest period-one consumption) is associated
with the highest p, while the smallest amnount  of private saving is associated with  the lowest p.  The
rise in p is coincident with the attraction of greater private saving, as two products of the increase in
net demand for such saving.  The source of this demand is the government budget deficit,  while the
availability of foreign borrowing provides a source of funds substitutable for private saving.
Real saving is rising with an increase in g, although not in a one-for-one manner  if foreign
borrowing  is possible.  It is falling with an increase in the accumulated stock of wealth and rising
with an increase in real taxation.  It is falling with negative output shocks in period one.9 Those
directly in Annex C.
a  In this case, if there  is (as illustrated in Figure  1) a differential between the domestic and
international real interest rates, then the definition of n in equations (1) must be expanded to include
the term (p - p) 0 . This  does not change the analysis, but incorporates the windfall gain from
foreign borrowing  at the relatively low international interest rate.
9 This last effects are not ambiguous, and provide an interesting contrast with the impact of
increased government expenditure.  All increase the excess demand in the goods market in period
one, but the government's  marginal propensity to consume in period one is unity.  Given the private
marginal propensity of 6, the impact of the output shock or taxation effect is reduced and can beSamng in Tranitdon  Economies  - 8
exogenous  factors that cause  an increase  in real saving do so through crowding out private
consumption;  the mechanism  is the rise in real interest rate p.
The flexibility  of access  to international  financial  markets is important  in this result. Consider
the extreme  case of f,p = 0, or access  to international  finance totally insensitive  to the domestic
interest rate.  Then only shifts in govermnent  expenditure,  taxation  or period-one  output matter to
saving, and these enter in a one-for-one  manner. The resource constraint is completely  binding, as in
equilibrium  A in Figure 1.  At the opposite  extreme, with ,B  (and A) approaching  infinity, the relative
price domestically  is equated to the international  relative price (p = p'), and ,B  is the endogenous
variable. Under that alternative  specification  the results are quite different. The results depend
critically  in this case upon I, the marginal  propensity  to consume in period one.  Saving is falling
with an income  shock, with an increase in carried-over  wealth and with an increase in tax.  This
reduction is not one-for-one  with the shock, however, since a portion of the shock is carried over into
period two through foreign borrowing. A government  expenditure  increase  has no impact  on saving,
as the trade deficit  is increased  one-for-one  with this increase.
As indicated  in equation  (2), private saving in equilibrium  is equal to the sum of the fiscal
deficit and the trade surplus. The channel  by which this equality  is achieved,  however, can differ
according  to the structure of the economy. If the fiscal deficit is taken as exogenous,  then the two
(not mutually  exclusive)  adjustment  channels  were outlined above: external  borrowing  or an increase
in private saving. There are further a number  of methods  for mobilizing  private saving.  One method
is through rationing of consumption  at fixed price and nominal interest rate; given the lack of other
uses for private income, "forced"  saving will occur.  Another is through adjustment  of p, the relative
price of goods in the two periods. For given period-two  price, there are two channels  for adjustment
of p to reflect excess  demands  for goods in period one.  The first is through an increase in PI,
causing  a rise in p and a shifting  of expenditures  to c2. The second is through an increase in the
nominal interest rate (for given P'), and will have the same effect.  Interest rate controls alone  do not
avert this adjustment;  such efforts will simply occasion  a price increase in P', as the commodity  price
in period one rises in response  to excess demand.
Modelling  saving in the dynamic transition.
Life-cycle  models  of consumption,  investment  and saving over an infinite  horizon provide a
convenient  starting point for the theoretical  model. The optimal behavior in Campbell  (1987)  or
Blanchard  and Fischer (1989) can be summarized  in the notation of the previous section, with
conditions  introduced  to govern the adjustment  of nominal  price (P') and the stock of financial  assets
(D') over time:
D=  (l+r)  D'  + PI  st  (3)
St=  yt - C-  tt  (4)
Pt =  P"' +  [ (g t - tt) - st - f(pt)]  (5)
reversed for extremely  high valuations  of period-one  relative  price p.Saving,  in Transidon  Economies  - 9
The stock of financial  assets rises with interest paid to holders and with the value of private saving in
the period.  The net material balance  condition (1) may not hold in flow equilibrium,  allowing  for
the possibility  of rationing in periods of excess demand. This excess demand  is a function  the
government deficit and the volume of foreign borrowing f(pt).lO  As equation (5) indicates,  such
excess demand will cause price inflation;  the limiting  case, as 0 approaches  infinity, is that of net
material balance.
The stock equilibrium  for this dynamic economy  has a saddlepoint  nature. It is illustrated  in
Figure 2.  AA represents  the combinations  of D and P that assure asset market stock equilibrium
(i.e., Dt = Dtl ) and GG the combinations  that ensure zero excess demand  in the goods market.  The
AA curve as drawn is steeper than the GG curve; this is a property  of the parameters  of the system.'
The system has a convergent  dynamic  only along the saddlepath  SS.
Consider the adjustment  along the saddlepath  from point A in Figure 2.  Excess demand is
positive (and thus private saving negative)  throughout  the adjustment,  as is indicated  by the gradual
liquidation  of the stock Dt.Y 2 In the absence  of real shocks  to output, the government  budget or
foreign borrowing, real consumption  (and real saving)  will be constant  through time but the nominal
excess demand in each period is lessened  and the rate of price inflation  slowed.  Nominal  goods
market equilibrium  and asset market stock equilibrium  are only achieved  concurrently,  however, at
the equilibrium  Q.
The analysis  of point A does not fully capture  the transition for the Soviet  system because  the
households  at independence  were not on their preferred trajectory. The constraints  on both price
levels and supply of goods led to rationing and forced saving off the SS curve. This forced saving
resulted in the "ruble overhang"  that could more properly in this context be characterized  as a
"deposit  overhang"  and illustrated  at point B.
The dynamic  followed  from B with price decontrol replicates  a number  of features  of private
adjustment  in the former Soviet republics. First, the quantity of deposits  was certainly  more than
necessary  to generate  demand  for the quantity of goods available: this is evident in B's distance
above  GG.  Second, households  nevertheless  held these deposits (rather than cash, for example)
because  of their claims on future consumption: this is evident in the distance  by which B is below
SS.  When prices were liberalized  there was an immediate  jump (to point C), followed  by ongoing
inflation  as households  tempered  the upward pressure placed on demand  for goods because  of the
effect of the ensuing  price increases  on purchasing  power in the future. The price jump is
represented  by the movement  from B to C on the saddlepath;  the ongoing inflation  by the movement
along SS from C toward Q.
10 The equation  of motion for foreign debt is subsumed  in the asset accumulation  equation, and
the nominal interest rate is the same on foreign  and domestic borrowing. These  assumptions  could  be
relaxed, but at the cost of modeling  the evolution  of international  debt separately.
"  The condition  for this to hold [ (act IaD t-)(g t - tt - ,')  >  r (8c t/aPt-)J is always true for Dt >
0.
12  This is not a requirement  of the model; the saddlepath  could  be upward-sloping  and still satisfy
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Real private saving in this adjustment  need not take a constant  value if there is access to
international  lending. In that case the intertemporal  adjustment  in p' can induce foreign  financial
flows that compensate  for variations in private saving. The relative price p' must be interpreted  here
as the vector of relative  prices of goods between  time t and all future time periods.
The predicted  path of saving is made more complex  by collapse  of commodity  production, as
for example  was observed in the former Soviet Union with independence. This here enters
exogenously  as an increase in the public-sector  deficit  to be financed  through the inflation  tax." 3 An
increase in the steady-state  real fiscal deficit  will have the effect of shifting  down the asset-market
curve to AA' and shifting in the goods-market  equilibrium  curve to GG' as in Figure 3.  Beginning
from equilibrium  Q, prices  jump immediately  to C' along  the new saddlepath  SS', and then decline
somewhat  as households  accumulate  deposits. The new steady state at E' has a larger nominal stock
of deposits but a reduced  real value. This period would be characterized  by excess supply of goods,
as prices have overshot the long-run  value.  Alternatively,  the increased  fiscal deficit could be
recognized  while still on the original saddlepath  around C -- if so, there would be an additional  jump
in P followed  by still further inflation  while moving down the other arm of SS' to Q'.  Similar
comparative  dynamics  demonstrate  the real saving- and deposit-increasing  effects of exogenous
increases  in nominal interest rates.
Channels for retention of saving
This analysis  presumed  that the financial  instruments  in which saving is placed can be
represented  by the homogeneous  asset Dt with given rate of return. In fact, there is great variation  in
the characteristics  of assets serving as stores of saving. The traditional instrument  was the home-
currency deposit in the formal financial  sector - during the Soviet  period, in the Saving Bank. Since
independence,  however, the potential saving instruments  have proliferated  to include deposits
denominated  in foreign currencies,  holdings  of foreign currencies, deposits  with informal financial
institutions  and trust companies,  and stocks of commodities.
The former Soviet  republics  have inherited  the Soviet  financial  system. The formal financial
sector in each republic includes  institutions  licensed by the state anid  is dominated  by a few large
organizations  continuing  to reprise their roles in the Soviet  system. The inherited Soviet structure  has
been explained  in detail elsewhere  - see, for example,  the text by Gregory and Stuart (1990), Hardy
and Lahiri (1992), Ickes and Ryterman  (1992)  or Conway  (1994a).  Three features are of importance
to the present study:  monopoly,  specialization,  and the dichotomy  between  cash and non-cash
transactions. The informal  sector includes  a collection  of unlicensed  intermediaries  whose activities
13  Explanation  of the collapse of production  in the former Soviet republics  will be a fascinating
task, but one largely outside the scope of the present  study.  I will examine  the incentives  to
enterprise saving, because  it is anomalous  to observe increased  real time deposits during a period of
free-fall  in enterprise production. One possible explanation  is the growth of an informal productive
sector unmeasured  in official statistics;  this will reinforce  the conclusions  on informal activity
discussed  below.
The fall in production  leads directly into large public-sector  deficits. State enterprises  have
reacted slowly  to the downturn, and have consequently  maintained  personnel  costs in excess of
revenues. These must be paid from the state budget. Further, the downturn  in economic  activity
leads to a downturn in taxation  revenue  for the government  and to an upturn in demand  for pension
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are poorly monitored  or understood.
The monopolistic  and specialized  features of formal financial intermediaries  have been carried
forward into the financial  sectors of the former Soviet republics. They have two implications  of
importance  to savers:  low (often  negative)  real interest rates in formal-sector  financial  institutions,
and an explosion  in activity  by informal intermediaries. Formal-sector  financial  institutions  have in
practice  been quite sluggish in raising interest rates on household  deposits  to rates in excess of
inflation. The following  table, for example, indicates  the nominal  rates on deposits in domestic
currencies  at the Saving Banks of various former Soviet economies  in mid-1993.
Saving Banks: Nominal Interest Rates on Deposits, mid-1993
Sight deposit  1-3 year deposit  Inflation
(2/92 to 2/93)
Kazakhstan  15  30  800
Ukraine  120  --  1400
Georgia  5  10  800
Belarus  20  40  800
Source: data collection  network.
Conway  (1994a) identifies  three possible reasons for these strongly negative  real interest rates.
First, it may be simple inertia in responding  to market forces: these-were  the rates used under the
Soviet  system, and these are the rates to use today. Second, the Saving  Bank may be responding  to
government  initiatives  to hold deposit  rates down so that lending  rates can also be depressed  - a clear
example  of the financial  repression  phenomenon  McKinnon  (1973)  discussed  in developing  countries.
Third, the Saving Bank may have little incentive  to attract more deposits. As Conway  (1993)
illustrates,  the monopoly  position of the bank vis-a-vis borrowers  and the problems  of imperfect
information  and enforcement  all work to reduce the desired  level of lending  of the Saving Bank at any
real interest  rate.  It will then set a deposit  real interest rate at the lowest level consistent  with
attracting  funds to finance the profit-maximizing  level of lending. This level drops even lower since
its deposits are presently  guaranteed  (in nominal  terms) by the government  in all these economies.
The financial  position  of the republics  of the former Soviet Union has become  much
"shallower"  in the period since independence. After a controlled  rise in prices in mid-1991,  a
substantial  liberalization  of prices in former members of the Soviet  Union occurred in January 1992.
With price increases  that reached 1000 percent in the first three months of 1992, the "ruble overhang"
was eliminated. Since  that time, price inflation  has remained  substantial.
Private saving and fiscal deficits: intermediating between the two.
The previous theoretical  examples  do not model the process  of intermediation  between  private
savers and the fiscal deficit. In the Soviet Union this process was nearly automatic: private saving
was deposited  with the public uni-bank  known as Gosbank,  and Gosbank  then extended  credit to
public investment  and consumption  activities. The interest rate was positive in real terms, but did not
fluctuate  to clear the credit market. Rather, the public sector by plan had first claim  on goods, and
the private sector was able to consume  only what remained. In a market economy  this would have
led to increased  commodity  prices (and a fall in p), but in the command  economy  the result was
rationing of consumption  and consequent  "forced  saving".  Saving in Gosbank  was in excess  of that
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"ruble overhang".  Since households  in the Soviet Union were not integrated  into international  capital
markets, imports did not serve as an alternative  for the scarce domestic  product.
With independence,  fiscal deficits rose and private income fell.  Together, these led to an
imbalance  in the capital market. There was further a loosening  of restrictions  on commodity  markets;
the result was an initial burst of inflation. The capital-market  imbalance  was worsened  by the
maintenance  of artificially  low nominal interest rates by the state banks.  This combined  with the
inflationary  burst to turn sharply negative  the real interest  rate on deposits and discourage  private
saving in the banking system.
There was thus an ex ante shortage  of saving. The short-term  solution  to this shortage relied
upon a variant of the "inflation  tax".  The private sector received  income in nominal assets (cash or
bank deposits). The fiscal deficit was financed  through the banking  system extension  of directed
credits refinanced  by the central  bank.  The fiscal purchases  were made with these credits; when the
private sector spent its income it found the supply of goods  limited. Excess demand then bid up the
price of goods.  In the notation of the previous section  this registers as saving, since the real value of
income exceeds  the real value of consumption. From the household  perspective,  however, it is a tax
because  the real value of purchasing  power in the present has been decreased  by the inflation.
The key to the effectiveness  of the tax was the private sector's continued  holding of nominal
assets denominated  in the home currency. The private sector quickly  recognized  this and switched its
holdings into assets denominated  in other currencies. I denote these other assets as foreign-exchange
holdings, either of cash or of deposits in the banking system. The tax became  less and less effective
as the tax base became  less and less, and in the spirit of Cagan  (1956) inflation  entered an upward
spiral.
Implications of the theory for observed  saving.
Private saving is the deferral of consumption  from the present  to future periods.  As noted
above, it responds  to price incentives. However, it is also subject in aggregate  to the fundamental
material balance  constraints,  especially  when foreign  lending is inelastically  supplied. Saving
reductions  will be triggered by negative  temporary  output shocks and increases  in government
expenditure  and taxation; it will also fall through increases  in the value of the stock of inherited
wealth. All of these scenarios  will be accompanied  by an increase in the relative price of goods at
present, either by rising nominal interest  rate or by increase  in period-one  price level.
The dynamics  of adjustment  to these shocks can be complex, as noted in the transition
analysis  above. The economies  of the former Soviet Union faced two adjustments  simultaneously.
Negative  output shocks reduced the volume of saving, ceteris paribus, while the deposit overhang  led
to a concurrent "shock" after price liberalization  through appropriate  adjustment  of the current price
for given interest rate to attain the equilibrium  real interest  rate consistent  with the availability  of
consumption  goods. This latter "shock"  is analyzed  in detail above, and indicates  the evolution of
nominal price through time to ensure material balance. The stock of nominal assets is declining  over
time, and the flow of real saving is kept constant  through  the adjustment  in real wealth.
Government  expenditure  as considered  in this section includes  both current expenditure  and
investment.  Reduction in government  expenditure  causes lower real interest  rates and increased
private consumption,  other things equal.  This expenditure  reduction  could  follow from separate
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resources  from the private sector through taxation  or saving mobilization,  then private desired
consumption  will rise.
A reduction in formal-sector  saving deposits need not be a reliable indicator of the flow of
real saving in the economy. These deposits  will fall into disfavor with savers if financial  authorities
impose artificially  low real interest rates through nominal interest rate controls and persistent  inflation
due to government  budget deficits. Other saving instruments  will then provide a more effective  hedge
against interest-rate  risk, and will absorb an increasing  share of observed saving activity. These
saving instruments  will not at present provide resources  for government  investment  or consumption,
but will be tapped by others in the private sector to finance their own consumption  or investment.
II.  Does private saving still occur?
The theoretical  model  presented earlier indicates  that private saving will decline  with
worsening  of the income of the private sector, and that this decline  will be coincident  with either high
nominal  interest rates or inflation  as methods  of achieving  the equilibrium  quantity  of consumption.
In practice, the adjustment  mechanism  has worked  through inflation, since the economies  have
controlled  nominal interest rates.  The income shocks  in the former Soviet economies  have further
been continuous  and negative.  Government  expenditure  programs have been reduced only little in the
period of independence. Therefore it is a real possibility  that private saving has disappeared,  or
dwindled  to very little, during the post-independence  period.
Despite  the importance  of informal  sources and uses of household  income, statistical
information  is unavailable. The governmental  statistical  agencies in a number of these countries
continue  to administer  surveys that ask only about the formal sources of income; as a result, much
economic  activity goes unmeasured." 4 The mismeasurement  of sources and uses of income  has
profound  effects  for policy discussions. In the absence  of a complete  cataloguing  of resource  flows,
the analysis  of consumer  demand and saving will be skewed: there may be an underestimation  of the
volume of household  saving that could be attracted  to formal financial  intermediation  through
appropriate  use of incentives  (e.g., positive  real interest rates).
In collaboration  with statisticians  in Georgia  and Kazakhstan,  I have written and implemented
a survey instrument  that examines  the importance  of non-formal  income and expenditures  in the
household  budget. It is based upon the household  flow of funds, and is designed  to elicit information
about the inflow of resources from all sources and the usage of this total inflow. The survey
instruments  as prepared for Georgia  and Kazakhstan  are provided in Annex  B in English and Russian.
The flow of funds is illustrated  in Figure 4.  The sources of funds will equal the uses of
funds.  Formal-sector  income will be only one of many sources of funds, while deposits in the formal
banking system will be only one of many non-consumption  uses of funds.  Truthful responses  to the
14  This lacuna in the reach of the statistical instruments  was recently remarked in a Wall Street
Journal article on Russian  statistics. For example,  Mr. Yuri Yurkov  of Goskonistat-Russia  is quoted
as saying that a reported 29 percent drop in industrial  output is "just a sign of a more market-oriented
economy". Misha Belkindas  of the World Bank states that "the old statistical system is breaking
down, and the new one has yet to be built".  See Claudia  Rosett, "Figures Never Lie, but They
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series of questions  of the survey provide a more detailed examination  of household  economic  activity
and saving than has heretofore  been available.
The Flow of Funds survey was administered  in August  and November  1994  to 500
households  in Georgia  and in Kazakhstan. Its scope is quite limited  in depth of questionnaire  and in
geographical  reach of the survey. It does, however, provide a first look at the private-sector  activity
of households  in these transition economies. In the following  sections  I report results from the first
round of each of these surveys. The results reported here are not exhaustive,  but are focused upon
the saving behavior  and foreign exchange  use of the households. Conway  (1994b)  provides further
detail on the income and expenditure  characteristics  of the sample.
Results of the Georgia survey.
The Tbilisi economy  in each sampling  period was one in which most expenditure  is
undertaken  for subsistence. Of the aggregate  sample, 81 percent of respondents  indicated  that more
than half of available  income in July was spent upon food alone; 33 percent indicated  that over 80
percent of income  goes for this use.  In October, 92 percent of those sampled  indicated  that more
than half of available  income was spent upon food, and 64 percent indicated  that over 80 percent of
available  income went to food purchase. Durable  purchases  were only reported in 7 instances  in July
and 10 instances  in October. Roughly one-third  of households  reported clothing  purchases in July,
and only 22 percent did so in October.
The heads of households  were asked whether  their households  had deposited  funds in the last
month in two types of accounts. The first was a commercial  bank deposit in coupons (the national
currency), while  the second was a deposit in foreign  exchange  (typically  US dollar) holdings. In
July, only 19 households  indicated  making commercial-bank  deposits  in coupon;  these were on
average for 30 percent of total monthly income. 22 households  indicated  some deposit  into hard-
currency  holdings during the previous month, with an average  value of nearly 40 percent of total
monthly  income among  those depositing. These activities  were primarily  undertaken  by those with
income  primarily from the private sector:  only 10 percent of  public-sector  households  indicated  use
of hard-currency  deposits, while the corresponding  rate for private-sector  households  was 32
percent." 5 By October, 7 households  indicated  making coupon  deposits, for an average  of around 10
percent of total monthly income.
The heads of households  were asked to indicate  whether  anyone  in their household  had
received  funds (through income, borrowing  or exchange)  in foreign  currencies. These currencies
include  Russian  rubles and US dollars.  Of the total, 63 percent indicated  yes and 37 percent indicated
no in each sample.  Those with substantial  foreign-currency  income were predominantly  from the
private sectors.  Of those indicating  in that a majority  of household income  in October  came from the
govermment  sector, 92 percent indicated  receiving  less than half of total income in foreign  currency.
The corresponding  percentages  for "private sector" and "other", respectively,  were 22 percent and 29
15 Those utilizing  the coupon deposits were predominantly  from the "other-income"  sector,
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percent."6  Of total households,  over 49 percent (for July) and 56 percent (in October)  indicated  that
they relied upon these foreign currency  receipts for more than half of total income  to the household.
The uses of foreign currency  ran the gamut of possible activities. Over 60 percent of those
receiving  foreign currency in July and over 80 percent in October  indicated  that they used it for
purchase  of goods and services."  Another 14 percent (in July) and 10 percent (in October)  indicated
holding it at home as saving, while 5 percent (in July, but zero in October)  placed some in bank
deposits.  One respondent  in August  and 2 in November  indicated  that a portion of foreign currency
had been placed with a trust company  -- despite  the wholesale  failure of those institutions during the
preceding months.  Other uses included  the payment  of debts, lending to individuals  and gifts to
friends and family.
Results of the Kazakhstan survey.
The dominant source of income in the samples  was the formal-sector  salary, with 48 percent
of the July households  and 50 percent of the October  households  indicating  it as the sole source.
Another one-third in each sample  indicated  that more than half of total income came from that source.
Only 11 percent of households  in July and 6 percent in October indicated  that no income came from
formal salaries.  Other sources  of income were important  to much smaller groups of respondents. In
July, only 8 percent indicated  that all or more than half of income came from government support
(pensions, stipends), and 5 percent indicated  sale of agricultural  products as a source of more than
half of income. Private business  was responsible  for a majority  of income in 13 percent of the
households, and interest from deposits  or rentals was the majority  source of income in only one
household. In October, the percentages  for non-formal  income  sources were the same, except that no
one indicated  sale of agricultural  produce  as a source of a majority  of income and 2 households
indicated  interest or rental income as responsible  for more than half of total income.
Households  also obtained funds by selling possessions. Nearly  20 percent of the households
surveyed in each sample indicated  selling possessions. Of those, 42 percent sold possessions  worth
less than $22 in July, while another 21 percent sold items valued  between $22 and $44.  In October,
26 percent of those selling possessions  sold goods valued  at $20 or less, while an additional  22
percent sold items valued at $20-40. In each sample, the remainder  sold possessions  of even higher
value.  In each sample these sales were disproportionately  done by those in the non-formal  sector,
with 28 or 29 percent of those in the non-formal  sector doing so and 16 percent from the formal
sector.
Borrowing  and dissaving by households  was a common  method for obtaining funds.  Over 50
percent of the sample indicated  that they had borrowed  or dissaved  during July, with the value of this
dissaving  exceeding  $40 during the month for one-third  of these individuals.  Others responding  for
July reported receiving  back loans previously  made to others; 22 percent of the sampled households
indicated  receiving  such repayment  of principal. In the November  sample, 39 percent of those
16  Even this low percentage  may be too high.  It is illegal, though rarely enforced, to accept
payment in foreign currencies  without a license  to do so.  Those indicating  no may be misrepresenting
their position for fear of legal reprisal.
"  The percentages  quoted in this section  will not sum to 100 percent, for some respondents
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surveyed indicated  borrowing  or dissaving in October, with 29 percent of these household  indicating
dissaving  exceeding  $40 during that month. In October, 14 percent of the population  received
principal  back from prior loans.
The responses  on expenditure  questions in Kazakhstan  indicated  less stringency  of the
budgetary situation  when compared  with Georgia. The households' share of funds devoted  to food
purchases, for example,  were high but not extreme: only 7 percent of the population in both July and
October  indicated  spending more than 80 percent of funds on food, with 50 percent (in July) and 33
percent (in October)  reporting expenditure  on food of 40-80 percent of income. Clothing and
communal  services (utilities)  were significant  expenditures  for the majority  of households;  in July and
October, for example,  32 and 26 percent, respectively,  indicated  expenditures  of more than 20
percent of resources on clothing. Deposits in tenge accounts  at commercial  banks were reported  by
only 10  households  in July, and for relatively  small sums.  In October  there were no reported
deposits among  the 500 respondents.  Holdings  of foreign currency  were indicated  by 22 households
in July and 31 households  in October. Durable goods purchases  were reported by 22 and 35
households  in the two samples.
The responses  on uses of funds were for the most part statistically  indistinguishable  by source
of majority  of income. Those categorized  above as "formal  sector" income  earned spent a
significantly  larger (at the 95 percent level of confidence)  share of resources on food, and a
significantly  small share on private business  and trading activity.
Of the respondents  for July, 18 percent (89 households)  indicated  receiving income  or
transfers denominated  in foreign currency. This number was drawn disproportionately  from those
households  in the non-formal  sector:  38 percent of non-formal  households  reported foreign-currency
income, while only 12 percent of formal-sector  households  did so.  The majority  of those receiving
income  reported receiving  less than half their funds in foreign currency, while only 4 households
indicated  that all funds received  were denominated  in foreign  currency. Five percent of households
reported using foreign  currency frequently  or exclusively  for food purchases,  while 5 percent also
indicated  use of foreign currency  frequently  or exclusively  for saving.  Only 2 households  reported
using foreign currency  frequently  or exclusively  in bank deposits. Three households  reported  using
foreign  currency in trust company  deposits.
In October, 15 percent of households  indicated  receiving income  or transfers denominated  in
foreign  currency. Thirty-three  percent of non-formal  households  reported foreign-currency  income,
while  only 9 percent of formal-sector  households  did so.  The majority  of those receiving  income
once again reported receiving  less than half their funds in foreign currency,  while only 4 households
indicated  that all funds received  were denominated  in foreign currency. Four percent of households
reported  using foreign currency  frequently  or exclusively  for food purchases, while 5 percent also
indicated  use of foreign currency  frequently  or exclusively  for saving.  Only 3 households  reported
using foreign currency  frequently  or exclusively  in bank deposits, while there were no reported
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The use of foreign currency is centered  in Almaty. The percentage  of respondents  in each
city indicating  a use of foreign currency and a reliance  on foreign currency  for denominating  income
is:
July  October
Use  Receipt  of over  Use  Receipt  of over
half of income  half of income
Almaty  37  10  28  11
Aktyubinsk  13  4  10  3
Chimkent  23  5  27  7
Ust Kamenogorsk  9  4  5  0
Kokshetau/Kustanai 24  9  14  4
Zhezkazgan  I I  0  18  3
The dependence  upon foreign currency  as a store of value also differs greatly across regions.  In
Chimkent and Kustanai  over 20 percent of respondents  in October  indicated  holdings of foreign
currency as saving instruments,  while in the other cities the comparable  percentages  were below 5
percent.
Conclusions on household saving in Georgia and Kazakhstan.
The survey results confirm certain  characteristics  of transactions  in these countries  that are
evident to all observers. First, currency  substitution  is advanced  in both economies  (and throughout
the former Soviet Union), with US dollars the currency  of choice for saving and durable purchases
and Russian rubles popular in Georgia  for non-durable  purchases. Second, expenditures  are
concentrated  on necessities, especially  food, in both countries. In Georgia  this has reached an
extreme  concentration. Third, the income  distribution in both countries  is unequal, with evidence
both of greater inequality  and greater absolute  poverty in Georgia.
There are other features  of the two economies  that observers  have suspected  but have been
unable to affirm.  The true usefulness  of this survey has been in the quantification  of these.
The sources of income for households  in the two economies  have diverged sharply since
independence. At that time, nearly all households  received  a majority  of income from formal-sector
(mostly  government)  sources. In Kazakhstan  this share of households  remains  high at 80 percent,
while in Georgia the transition has led to a minority of households  (29 percent in October 1994)  with
predominantly  government incomes. Private business  activities  were predominant  in 39 percent of
Georgian  households  but only 12 percent of Kazakhstan  households  in October.
* The sale of possessions  has become a significant  source of income  for households  in both
countries. In July, 25 percent of Georgian  households  and 20 percent of Kazakhstan  households
indicated  such sales.  In both countries, the percentage  of households  involved  in such activities fell
from July to October, although  more strikingly in Georgia. There is an interesting  divergence  in
these activities as well -- in Georgia  such sales were more common  among  those dependent  upon
government  salaries, while in Kazakhstan  they were more  common among  the families  dependent
upon non-formal  income.
'  Borrowing and dissaving  are also endemic  among  the households  in both countries. OfSaving  in Transition  Econonmies  - 18
Georgian  respondents  34 percent indicated  that they had undertaken  these activities  in July, while in
Kazakhstan  over 50 percent of respondents  had done so.  The amounts  borrowed or dissaved  were
also larger in Kazakhstan. Once again, there was a decline  in this percentage  from July to October in
both countries, although  in Kazakhstan  the percentage  remained  relatively high at 39 percent of
households.
Expenditures  on food take up a large share of household  purchasing  power, but the
Georgian  case is quite extreme. In Georgia  and Kazakhstan  33 and 3 percent of households,
respectively,  reported spending  over 80 percent of income  on food in July.  Those households
reporting expenditures  of over 60 percent of income on food were 63 percent of the Georgian  sample
and 17 percent of the Kazakhstan  sample. In October  the Georgian  situation had worsened: 44
percent reported expenditures  in excess  of 80 percent of income on food, and 74 percent expenditures
in excess of 60 percent. In Kazakhstan,  by contrast, the percentage  of households  with dominant food
expenditures  shrank: 3 percent in the over-80 percent category and 11 percent in the over-60 percent
category.
*  Saving activities  still continue in both countries, but they rarely take advantage  of the
formal banking  system.  National-currency  accounts  were reported by a handful  of households  in each
country. Foreign-currency  deposits  were equally likely in the two countries  in July with 4 percent of
households  in Kazakhstan. By October  such deposits were more likely in Kazakhstan  (6 percent of
households)  but not observed in the Georgian  sample. Holding of foreign currency at home was
reported by 10 percent of both Georgian  and Kazakhstan  households  in July; by October  the
percentage  in Kazakhstan  remained  constant  while that in Georgia fell to 7 percent of households.
Despite  the prominence  of "trust companies"  in recent news in both countries, only a handful  of
respondents  in each country indicated  participation  in these financial  intermediaries.
These  results contrast  with the evidence  from Family Budget  Surveys in Belarus: Conway
(1995). These surveys indicate  that 30 percent of the population continued  in July 1994  to rely upon
the formal-sector  financial  institutions  (primarily  the Saving Bank) for intermediation  and deposit
services.
Saving and the distribution of income in Ukraine.
I was unable  to organize a survey of household  activity for Ukraine, and thus have not
comparable  survey results on saving or the use of saving instruments. I do have some evidence  on
saving activity  from the household  budget survey conducted  in Ukraine for the fourth quarter of 1993;
these results are reported in Table 1.
Saving as a percentage  of income was apparently  well below its performance  before
independence. For the period 1985-1990,  national  saving in the Soviet Union averaged  25 percent of
national income, while in the last quarter of 1993  the Ukrainian  household saving rate was only 5
percent of household  income. As Table 1 makes clear, this small positive rate masks a wide
dispersion in the degree of saving  or dissaving among  households. Those at the low end of the
income  distribution  were dissaving  substantially,  either through liquidation  of bank balances  (although
these had depreciated  greatly by this time) or through sale of possessions. Those at the upper end
were saving on average about 15 percent of household  income -- a substantial amount,  but below the
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m.  The collapse of formal-sector deposit of saving:  evidence  from four countries.
In the last years of the Soviet Union, the share of national  product represented  by saving
deposits  was steadily rising.  This phenomenon  became  known as the ruble overhang,  and represented
the forced saving of individuals  unable to find goods to purchase  at the controlled  prices of the
economy  at that time.  As Figure 5 indicates,  the share of currency in circulation  to GNP rose from
under 10 percent in 1985 to nearly 15 percent in 1990, while the share of household  deposits in the
banking  system rose from 28 percent in 1985  to nearly 40 percent in 1990. This suppressed
purchasing  power would fuel the burst of inflation  observed  with independence  in the newly
independent  states.  Available  indicators suggest  that Belarus  and Ukraine  reacted  similarly to the
Soviet Union as a whole during this period of overhang.
Despite the suppression  of purchasing  power, there was no apparent  bias away from deposits
with the formal banking system. The relative  returns on cash and deposits remained  nearly constant
in the period through 1990, and this was reflected in the proportional  allocation  of the ruble
overhang. During the build-up  from 1985  to 1990, the ratio of household  deposits  to cash in
circulation  in the Soviet  Union remained  nearly constant  at 3.2 to unity.
The deposit-inflation nexus.
With the onset of inflation in 1991, the relative attractiveness  of banking  deposits  denominated
in domestic currency  declined  sharply.  Those holding wealth in nominal  domestic  assets (including
government  entitlement  programs) were made poorer by inflation  relative  to those with the ability to
diversify assets into real property and hard-currency  instruments. This was evident in the evolution
of real currency  and deposit  holdings for the period 1989 - 1993  in Belarus illustrated  in Figure 6.
The data points represent  the currency and deposits as of the end of the stated year defined  in terms
of 1989 rubles."'  Inflation eroded the real value of nominal  assets, as indicated  by the downward
sloping lines.  In the year 1992, for example,  the real value of the stock of deposits of the population
fell from 13.3 billion to 2.2 billion rubles.  In each period there was an addition  to the real value of
the stock of deposits  through the inflow of saving resources to those instruments: this is indicated  in
the figure by the vertical arrows.  Although  the magnitudes  for 1993 appear  small in 1989 rubles, the
combined  real increase in holdings  of these two instruments  represented  saving of over 5 percent of
GDP in Belarus.
Only in 1990  did the increase in holdings  compensate  for the loss in value due to inflation;
the real stocks of these instruments  were falling thereafter. The lesson to private savers of 1992  and
1993 in Figure 6 must be not to do it in domestic  currency-denominated  assets: the value of holdings
at the beginning  of each year dwindled  to almost  zero by the end of the year. There was also a shift
in the nominal instruments  held by the private sector. The share of currency emission  in the
inducement  of private saving had been growing over the years -- nearly zero in 1990,  but playing  the
dominant  role in 1993.  As noted above, this indicated  the growing  reliance of the government  upon
the "inflation  tax" to effect the internal transfer.
The loss in private purchasing  power is striking. Conversion  of the loss in real purchasing
power implied  by the inflation-induced  devaluation  of currency  and deposit  holdings of the population
"'  The GDP deflator is used to calculate  these: inflation  rates for the years 1990  through 1993
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into 1993 rubles yields a total devaluation  of the stock of nominal  wealth equal to 53 percent of GDP
in 1993.
Inflation was also a problem in Ukraine, as was the flight from the karbovanets-denominated
instruments  of the financial  sector. This is illustrated  in Figure 7.  Banking  deposits are separated
into four components  in the two panels; the first panel indicates  the ratio of sight deposits (both by
enterprises and by households)  to cash in circulation, while the second  panel reports the ratios of time
deposits to cash in circulation. These include  only deposits in karbovanets  (or, before that, in rubles),
and does not include  the use of foreign exchange  deposits.
A similar pattern is evident in each panel. Household  deposit  holdings in karbovantsy  began
at large multiples  of the quantity of cash in circulation  but rapidly dwindled  to nearly zero.  From the
beginning  of 1993  it is clear that households  have ceased  to rely upon the banking sector as a store of
wealth. Enterprise deposit  holdings have followed  an inverted-U  pattern in both cases.  Sight deposits
and cash are the traditional  method for enterprises  to hold balances  for day-to-day  expenditures,  and
reliance on sight deposits grew with the government  use of directed  credits through the banking
system to finance enterprise  operations. Time deposits also became  relatively attractive  during the
early months of 1993; given the low interest rates on directed credits, maintenance  of time deposits
may well have been more attractive  than production.
Negative real interest rates on deposits were one cause  of the households' flight from
karbovanets  banking  deposits. As Table 2 indicates,  ex post monthly real interest rates were negative
throughout 1993. Not surprisingly,  households  sought  to reallocate  saving away from the banking
sector.  However, no matter  how negative  the deposit  rate, the refinance  credits were usually  more
negative  -- enterprises  were thus shielded  from these losses as they held borrowed funds on account.
There was a movement  to positive  real interest rates on deposits in early 1994. This should
have caused  an uptick in the use of deposits  by households. Such an uptick is there, though small, in
the holdings of time deposits relative  to cash in the first four months of 1994; see Figure 7.
The attraction  of foreign exchange in an inflationary environment.
The holding  of foreign exchange  provides a hedge against  the inflation  tax on accumulated
wealth. This alternative  has become quite prevalent  in the former Soviet economies,  as is evident in
the very liquid informal markets in foreign currencies. One hedge is of course to hold the banknotes
of the foreign currency, while another is to make foreign-exchange  denominated  deposits with a
financial  intermediary. This latter strategy  has proved quite lucrative  for private savers.  Commercial
banks have been quite active  in offering  these deposits, as noted in the following  section of this
report, as have "trust companies".  The surveys  reported above provide  the only available  consistent
evidence  on holdings of foreign  banknotes  or use of non-bank  financial  intermediaries,  but
commercial-bank  deposits in foreign  exchange  provide  a lower bound on the importance  of these
deposits in attracting  wealth.
In the Ukraine, foreign currency  deposits  grew rapidly relative  to cash in circulation. These
deposits were not offered in Ukraine  prior to independence,  but they became  attractive in the
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declining  thereafter.' 9 There was notably a decline in foreign-exchange  deposits in early 1994 that
was a mirror image of the upturn in household  holdings of karbovantsy  time deposits.
Foreign-exchange  deposits also became  more popular in Georgia. The monetary  survey for
Georgia  is presented  in Tables 3a and 3b for the period since December  1991. As the memorandum
item indicates,  domestic  credit has grown strongly during this period, with average  monthly  growth
rate of 38.9 percent over the period January 1993  - August 1994.  This has not been uniform
growth; domestic  credit creation  has peaked in the spring and the fall as planting- and harvest-related
activities  have been financed.'  A relatively small fraction of the domestic credit creation  was
allocated  to financing  of general government  (i.e., the government  budget);  the overwhelming
majority  was provided to state enterprises  to finance their activities. However, the nominal interest
rate on these credits was in general so low relative to inflation  that repayment  did not replenish  the
credit fund; the cost was borne through extreme inflation.
Broad money  represents  the liabilities  of the financial  sector. These liabilities  have evolved
over time to include an increasing  share of foreign-currency  deposits.  Banking  deposits
denominated  in coupons  have declined  as a share of domestic credit over this period, while currency
outside  banks has followed  a cycle from rather low percentages  of domestic  credit in early 1993 (the
period of currency shortages)  through elevated  percentages  in late 1993, to declining  shares in 1994
concluding  at a quite low percentage  that reflects the little real use for the coupon in the current
economy. Banking  deposits in foreign currency, by contrast, rose from zero at independence  to a
peak of 51 percent of domestic credit in January 1994. From that time until August 1994  the share of
foreign-exchange  deposits in domestic credit declined,  reflecting  in part the movement  of such funds
to the trust companies.
Foreign exchange  here refers to non-menati  currencies,  although  Russian  rubles and US
dollars were used for the majority  of transactions  in Georgia. There were liquid markets for foreign
exchange  in rubles or dollars -- the bazaar and exchange  shops provide exchange  for individual
transactions,  while the Tbilisi Interbank  Exchange  provided  auctions  for the larger transactions  of
commercial  banks for their clients (and on their own account).
Financial-sector  response.
The banking system in these countries was slow to adjust to the inflationary  environment,  but
private banks led the way in introducing  innovations  to attract deposits. One such innovation  was the
foreign-exchange  deposit. Another was the adjustment  of nominal interest rates and maturities  on
domestic currency-denominated  instruments  to reflect the more inflationary  and uncertain
environment. The state commercial  banks, and in particular the successors  to the Soviet  Saving
'9 This decline after July 1993  may be due to the exchange  rate used to convert the foreign-
currency values into karbovantsy. There was a substantial  overvaluation  of the official exchange  rate
during the last half of 1993 and early 1994, and this overvaluation  may have placed a downward  bias
on the share of foreign-currency  deposits in the monetary survey.
'  The indication  of 88 percent growth in domestic credit in August 1994 is misleading,  as this
reflects the creation of temporary credit facilities to clear arrears from state enterprises  to state
commercial  banks.  This operation allowed  the state commercial  banks to retire overdrafts  with the
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Bank, were much slower in adjusting  to these new financial  conditions;  as a result, the share of
saving deposited  in those traditional  repositories  fell sharply during this period.
The situation in Ukraine  reflects this evolution. By May 1994  the banking  system in Ukraine
had adjusted to the preferences  of its depositors  and was offering  a menu of deposits variegated  by
maturity and return.  As Figure 8 indicates,  the depositors (and the banks) in Ukraine favored shorter
maturities  for deposits as a means  for hedging  risks. 2'  The annualized  interest rates on household
deposits exhibited  a positively  sloped yield curve, with interest rates well in excess of the annualized
monthly inflation  rate observed  at that time.  The enterprise yield curve turned down in the
maturities  past 6 months, indicating  that those deposits may not be as responsive  to real interest rates
as they are to other factors (e.g., the contingency  of future lending  on present deposits).
This evolution  has important  consequences  for government  deficits and inflation. The
holdings of foreign exchange  or foreign exchange-denominated  instruments  represents an ever-
increasing share of private saving that the government  cannot  at present  tap.  Commercial  banks with
foreign-exchange  deposits will not willingly intermediate  for the government's  borrowing needs in
domestic currency at present low nominal interest rates -- this represents  a subsidy  to the government
that the commercial  banks cannot afford. The government  is forced in this instance either to issue its
own foreign exchange-denominated  debt at positive  real interest rates or to raise its return on
domestic  currency-denominated  debt to positive  real levels. In either case, the real cost of the
borrowing rises sharply.
Kazakhstan  is a good example  of this process. It was characterized  in 1994 by a small
volume of private saving.  Private investors  and commercial  banks attract  the funds of those who did
save, and this saving was made available  to private investors and traders.  The government  budget
was not competitive  in its efforts to attract saving, and relied upon currency  emission  for financing.
The government is able to "attract"  saving in this case only through exploitation  of the private
sector's need for currency; it has as cost the reduction in the real value of original nominal  financial
assets known as the inflation  tax.  The banking  system was slow to attract saving from the population
or enterprises in domestic  currency, as it was able to rely upon National Bank of Kazakhstan  (NBK)
refinancing  credits.  In the end, this circuit of financing  only enriched the bankers without attracting
any real resources -- the NBK was in the end been dependent  upon inflation  to achieve  its financial
goals.
The change in the pattern of saving also has implications  for resource allocation. Saving in
foreign exchange  would be beneficial  if intermediaries  existed  to ensure that the funds were allocated
to high-return investment  activities. In fact, however, the intermediaries  in foreign exchange  focus
upon the financing  of trade expeditions  to bring back consumer  goods  to the countries. These goods
are imperfect  substitutes  for those available  for domestic  currency. Consumption  thus rises, inflation
hits the domestic economy  and the domestic  currency  depreciates  against foreign exchange.  The
population  also made "deposits"  with non-banking  intermediaries  such as Smagulov  and Company;
these investments  were denominated  in tenge for one-month  maturity and were yielding 600 percent
annual interest (50 percent per month). This saving was however financing  the purchases  of the
21  The bars in this figure indicate  the shares of total deposits  (household  plus enterprise) that fall
into each category. The total shares sum to 500 so that the scales  of the two sets of information  can
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company.
This financial-market  experience  in Kazakhstan  provides two lessons  to the government's
economic  strategists.  First, the real cost of financing  the ongoing budget deficit was quite high.  The
credit auctions  coordinated  by the NBK and the interest rates offered  on dollar deposits at the
commercial  banks indicated  that saving was quite scarce. This scarce saving was being attracted by
private actors -- commercial  banks and "trust companies"  like Smagulov  and Company  -- through
offering  higher real interest rates than were available in the Narodnyi Bank or other state commercial
banks.  Second, there is an opportunity  for the government  to attract this saving if it is willing to
raise the interest rate that it pays on borrowed funds to compete  with these private actors.
IV.  Other financial  depositories for private saving.
As noted above,  saving in the Soviet  Union has historically  taken place through deposit in
long-term  financial  instruments  in the formal banking  sector, primarily in the Saving  Bank (or
Sberbank). These deposits  became  unattractive  as stores of wealth during the extreme  inflation  after
independence,  and savers were attracted  to alternative  instruments. Some of these alternative
instruments  were provided  by private commercial  banks, while others were made available  by non-
bank financial institutions.
Although there has been a general tendency  within the former Soviet economies  toward
disintermediation,  certain individual  banks have been quite successful at operating  and attracting
deposits in this environment. I have surveyed commercial  banks in Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan  and
Ukraine. The successful  banks  have offered  high nominal interest rates, often on hard-currency
deposits, and have introduced  other innovations  designed  to entice  depositors and establish  their
confidence. Their major competition  has come from non-bank financial  institutions  also promising
high returns on deposits  or from individual  hoarding of foreign exchange  banknotes. The successor
banks to the Soviet Saving Bank have as a rule been quite slow to innovate  in the post-independence
inflationary  environment;  as a result, their historical monopoly  in the provision of deposits  has been
diminished  in many  of these countries.
In this section  of the report I summarize  conclusions  on other depositories  for private saving.
Greater detail on individual  intermediaries  and the financial  systems of individual  countries  is
provided in Annex C.
Although  there has been substantial  variation in the development  of financial  sectors in
transition economies,  there are two stylized facts that characterize  this evolution. First, the financial
sector  has split into two markets with one denominated  in the domestic currency  and the other
denominated  in foreign exchange. Second, there has been a profusion of commercial  banks chartered
in the transition economies,  but very few of these offer opportunities  for saving.  Third, these banks
have chosen one or the other market to work in -- most specialize  in either domestic-currency  or
foreign-exchange  financial  instruments. Fourth, the legal framework  has been conducive  as well to
the growth of non-bank  financial  intermediaries  offering financial  transactions, often  promising  higher
returns than the chartered  institutions.
Financial  market bifurcation.
A bifurcation  of financial  markets emerged in these countries soon after independence. The
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financial  intermediaries  were the successors  to the state banks -- Promstroibank,  Agroprombank,
Kredsotsbank,  Vnesheconombank  and Sberbank. The government  or state enterprises  were net users
of funds in this market, while  the households  were on net the source of funds. An alternative
financial  market grew up in hard currency. The private commercial  banks and trust companies  were
the intermediaries  in this market, and the sources  and uses of funds were largely households  and
private enterprises. The real interest rate on deposits diverged  sharply in the two markets; in the
traditional market the real interest rate was strongly negative,  while in the alternative  market the real
interest rate was strongly positive.
The credits in local currency were not allocated  by an economic  competition,  but were
directed  by the government  to enterprises, collectives  or individuals  as it suited the advancement  of
government  policy. These credits were in the pre-independence  days offered  at positive real interest
rate, but since independence  and the onset of inflation  the nominal interest rate on these loans has
lagged significantly  behind  the inflation  rate.  The government's  credit policy has thus had a
substantial  subsidy component,  favoring  those able to receive  these credits. The maturity  on these
loans has varied, but in many cases (e.g., the loans of Agriprombank  for the planting season)  these
are for 6 months to one year.
These directed credits were not offered  by the central  bank, but by the state commercial  banks
with whom the targeted enterprises  had accounts. These state-owned  banks were then provided
refinance  credit by the central  bank at a slightly lower nominal interest rate.  Although  the central
bank in principle  offset these credits with a claim against  the resources  of the Ministry  of Finance, in
practice  the government resources were insufficient  to cover the volume  of refinance  credit issued.
There were similarly  only small amounts  of private saving deposited  with the state commercial  banks
(e.g., Sberbank). The public-sector  borrowing requirement  was thus financed  on the whole through
the "inflation  tax" described earlier.  Competition  did not drive up the real interest rate and thus
encourage  greater voluntary  saving because  those enterprises  receiving  credits were not profitable  on
the whole -- the government  supported them at least in part through  the credit subsidy inherent in the
low nominal interest rate.  These enterprises  had no incentive  to bid up the cost of funds.
Most credits extended  without central-bank  refinancing  are now denominated  in foreign
currencies,  mainly US dollars or Russian  rubles.  These loans are extended  almost always as working
capital for trade transactions.'  These are short-term  loans with maturities  usually in the 1- to 3-
month range. The interest rates charged  on these loans are quite high by international  standards, with
the most conservative  banks charging 15-25  percent annual rate of interest in US dollars, and with
more aggressive  banks charging that amount  of interest  per month. There is in addition  a requirement
of collateral  in precious  metals or real estate on these loans, with the value of the collateral  between
'  There is a paradox  involved in the rapid growth of these foreign-exchange  financial  markets.
They rely upon the existence  within  the economy  of a stock of foreign currency  that can be borrowed
and lent, but this stock of foreign currency can only be accumulated  through a succession  of current
account surpluses  or capital outflows. The official  statistics for these countries  since independence
indicate  a series of current account deficits and capital inflows  greater than outflows; if true, the stock
of foreign  currency in circulation  should be reduced  over time rather than increased. Transactions  not
captured in official  statistics are seemingly  characterized  by large trade surpluses (as for example  in
international  sales of resource  stocks) -- or the countries  are home to an ability  to counterfeit  the
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150-300  percent of the loan.  Not surprisingly, given  the high monthly interest rate, the more
aggressive  banks report a large share of loans delinquent  at maturity.2 3
These foreign-currency  credits are offered  to both enterprises  and individuals. The
prototypical  credit will finance an international  trading transaction. Goods from abroad are purchased
in foreign markets -- Turkey,  India, Germany -- and are imported into Georgia.  They are then sold
in the bazaar at a substantial  mark-up, with the proceeds  being used to retire the loan. There is
clearly substantial  risk involved  in these transactions,  given the fickle taste and small effective  demand
of the consumers,  but enough success  stories have surfaced  to encourage  a population  desperate to
retain past living standards  to pledge  jewelry and apartments  against such a loan.  The result of this
intermediation  is the use of saving for the financing  of consumption  (usually,  luxury consumption)
expenditures. The high cost of financing  working capital  for a productive transaction  is evident,  'and
leaders of the banking  sector indicate  that very few loans are provided for productive or investment
purposes.
The high positive real interest rate on US dollar credits appears  to be the product of a number
of factors.  First is the probability  of non-repayment  (as noted above). Second, the variable costs of
banking activity  are quite high.  Third, as theory demonstrates,  an economy  with excess demand  for
present consumption  (as above)  without  access to international  credits will drive up the real interest
rate to induce those with loanable  funds to part with them.  Fourth, and most fundamentally,  there is
little saving at present. Although  such saving is held predominantly  in foreign exchange  or in real
assets, this flow of saving is small relative  to the demand by traders.  This excess demand  for
loanable  funds causes the high real interest rates in the hard-currency  financial market; these more
accurately  reflect  the premium put upon consumption  today by the residents  of these countries.
The bifurcation  in credit markets extends  to the variety of deposits observed in the banking
system. There is little deposit  activity in domestic  currency by individuals;  what deposit  activity there
is represents  enterprises  holding  the balance  of directed  credits until its disbursement. Evidence  from
Georgia's monetary survey indicates  that banking  deposits in coupons  were roughly stable at 20
percent of domestic  credit in the months January-August  1994, while banking  deposits in foreign
currencies  averaged in excess of 40 percent of domestic  credit.  This ascendancy  of foreign-exchange
deposits will be accentuated  in later periods, as noted  below.
The large differential  in interest rates between  the domestic-currency  and foreign-exchange
financial  markets  provides a lucrative  speculative  opportunity. Those actors with an ability  to borrow
in domestic currency  and to lend in foreign currency  have gained large windfall profits.  The interest
rates are not bid together by speculation  because  the supply of domestic-currency  credits at low
interest rate is limited to the directed  credits of the government. 24 However, the continuing  supply of
23  For example,  Iberiabank  reported 30 percent delinquency  at maturity -- although they were
rolling over the loans and anticipated  being paid in full (with interest)  eventually.
4 Although  there are no systematic  data, there were numerous  reports that recipients  of directed
credits found it profitable  simply  to convert  the principal  to foreign exchange  and to hold that
currency to the term of the loan. Then a small fraction of the principal  was re-converted  to domestic
currency  to provide  both principal  repayment  and interest. In this case, the directed credit clearly did
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these credits provided constant  depreciating  pressure on the country's exchange  rate.
The proliferation  of commercial  banks and trust  companies.
There has been tremendous  growth in the number of commercial  banks in operation in the
former Soviet economies  since independence. The growth began in 1987 with the restructuring  of the
operations  of Gosbank  and the chartering  of non-governmental  cooperative  banks.  However, the
number  has increased  exponentially  since independence  in these countries. From less than 10 banks
in each country at independence  the number rose by mid-1994  to over 200 in Kazakhstan,  230 in
Georgia,  and similar explosions  in Belarus  and Ukraine.
This growth did not in general indicate  increased  opportunity  for or competition  to attract
depositors. Commercial  banks found "origination"  of directed credits refinanced  by the national  bank
to be quite profitable. Attraction  of deposits was more expensive,  given  the high costs of establishing
branch offices, and required more detailed record-keeping. Finally, that activity involved  some risk
to the bank if assets and liabilities  were not matched  as to maturity and interest rate.  This risk did
not occur in the origination  market. Finally, the deposits denominated  in the national  currency  were
an inherently  poor saving instrument  during a period  of extreme inflation,  but the banks were not in a
strong enough financial  position  to offer inflation-hedging  improvements  to these instruments  (e.g.,
indexed  interest rates).
Commercial  banks were chartered  in great number. A large subset of these also qualified  for
"general  licenses"  that permitted the bank to denominate  its deposit  and lending activity either in
national  currency  or foreign exchange. The competition  for depositors in fact surfaced in the foreign-
exchange  transactions, since the banks had an excess  demand for foreign-exchange  credits. Interest
rates in these markets were bid up to extremely  high levels. This reflected in part the profitability  of
international  trading transactions, but also in part the emergence  of Ponzi schemes  and ill-advised
financial  transactions  in the underregulated  markets of these economies.
The "trust  company"  phenomenon.
Commercial  banks were not the only financial institutions  to thrive in the volatile financial
environment  after independence;  non-bank  financial institutions  also proliferated. These  took a
number  of forms, from foreign exchange  bureaus to Lombard companies  (or pawnshops),  but the
most famous (or infamous)  were the "trust companies". These were non-bank  institutions  that offered
deposits  or shares with interest rates or capital  gains promised  to exceed  returns available  in the
banking  system.  The MMM corporation  of Moscow  was the best-known  of these, but similar
institutions  grew up in all the countries  observed.
These trust companies  operated in a standard manner. Each sold monthly  certificates. The
firm set a buying and selling  price each month, and these prices rose from month to month to
guarantee  a positive return to investors. For example,  certificates  in the Golden Bowl Corporation  of
Georgia  had risen in value from $.98-$l in June 1994 to $2.30-$2.50  in October 1994 for a
compounded  monthly  return of about 25 percent.  These trust companies  were not chartered  by the
government  and were not typically  regulated by the national  bank or any other government
organization.
exchange  that caused  the nominal exchange  rates at the bazaar in these countries  to depreciate  more
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The first wave of trust companies  attracted  clients with the promise of -- and initial success in
returning - 20 percent return per month  on deposits. Some of these may have been pure "Ponzi"
schemes, but others were financial  intermediaries  with ties to corporations  able to turn high short-term
profits through trading operations. These organizations  were able to offer such high returns because
of the profits from trading activities  and because  deposits were loaned out completely  - negligible
reserves were held for repurchase  of deposit  certificates.  The success of these corporations  attracted
competitors,  both from newly created  trust companies  and from more aggressive  commercial  banks.
The cash flow from deposit  receipts and repayments  of lending was sufficient  to cover withdrawals
until the failure of the Russian  firm MMM. During the time of the MMM crisis in Moscow,
depositors in other countries  approached  their trust companies  to redeem their certificates. The trust
company  was typically  unable  to meet these demands,  and was forced to close. In Georgia there
were 15 to 20 such companies  during their heyday in the first half of 1994, but few remained  after
the MMM crisis.
These failures were liquidity-driven. Subsequent  failures were related  to insolvency,  and
occurred in one of two ways. The first was through theft:  for exarnple,  the Golden Bowl
Corporation  failed when the chairman  fled the country (reportedly  with $60 million). Smagulov  and
Company  in Kazakhstan  similarly  closed in late 1994  after a year of operation as a "trust company";
Mr. Smagulov  was reported to be in Australia. The second was through ineptitude. Here, the case
of Innovation  Bank in Georgia  is instructive. This bank was backed by the Ministry of Internal
Affairs and offered high interest rates on deposits. The leaders  of the bank made a number of
improper loans, including  a 400,000 USD loan to a woman friend, while  paid-in capital was valued at
less than a tenth of that.  Most loans were made to the founders  of the Bank.  Each borrower
proposed a productive  use for the loan, but these were not well thought out and not well screened  by
the bank.  The bank was warned about its behavior  a number of times by the National Bank of
Georgia  before it finally failed.
Much "trust company"  activity  was fraudulent. There were also reports, however, of
companies  resorting to formation of trust companies  because  of the shortage  of available credit in the
banking  system.  This is comparable  to, though less dramatic  tharn, the formation  of a commercial
bank by a trading company. In each case the shortage  of credit from the banking system encouraged
the formation of a "captive"  financial intermediary.
Dynamic growth of foreign-exchange  deposits with private commercial banks.
The market for foreign-exchange  deposits  and credits was a much freer and more dynamic
environment  for financial  activity. The fastest-growing  banks were private commercial  banks that
specialized  in this market. Although  these private banks had international  correspondents,  these
relationships  did not extend  to credit lines; as a result, the banks were constrained  in their ability to
offer credits by the volume of deposits they could attract. The interest rates offered on these deposits
were thus well in excess of the international  rate.  Foreign-exchange  licenses  were necessary  in each
country  before banks could  participate  in these transactions,  and the qualifications  for obtaining  these
licenses  were fairly strict.  As a result, private commercial  banks were separated into two groups.
Those that had obtained the proper licenses  were able to grow quickly, while those without such
licenses  stagnated.
Banks  that made the strategic  decision  to specialize  in domestic-currency  transactions  were
typically  hamstrung  by the unattractiveness  of nominal domestic-currency  instruments  in a period  of
extreme  inflation. In Kazakhstan  and Georgia,  respectively,  Alataubank  and Kerdsobank  were twoSavwng  in Transition  6conomime  - 28
examples: private banks, but without the dynamism  of those specializing  in foreign-exchange
transactions. This tendency  existed, but was less pronounced,  in Ukraine; there, Inkobank  became
the largest private bank through a concentration  on foreign-exchange  instruments  while Agiobank  was
able to expand  its operations  through reliance upon innovative  and high-yield  instruments  denominated
in karbovanets  for attracting  private depositors.
Specialization  and sluggish adjustment of state commercial banks.
With the bifurcation  of the financial  markets, the former state commercial  banks (other  than
the Saving Bank) found it profitable  to act as the originator of directed  credits in domestic currency
that the national  banks refinanced. The return to the bank was in effect indexed  to inflation,  since the
"fee" received  was a fixed percent of the value of the directed credit.  Given  this secure and relatively
stable source of funds, these banks did not find it profitable  to attract deposits  in domestic currency.
This proved to be true across countries  for the successor banks to Agroprombank  (Agro-Industry
Bank) and Promstroibank  (Industry  Bank). The sole exception  proved to be during periods of cash
shortage; in those circumstances  these banks (for example, Promstroibank  of Belarus)  solicited
deposits from households  because  the deposits would be made in domestic  banknotes  that could be
redistributed  to other clients.
The successors  to the Saving Bank in each country were rather slow to adjust to the new
economic  environment. The banks remained  state banks for some time in all countries, and their
management  thus remained  under the direction of the state bureaucracy. As a result, the Saving Bank
was not allowed  in most instances  to capitalize  upon its existing monopoly  in the collection  of
domestic-currency  deposits. Interest rates paid on deposits were adjusted  infrequently,  and by too
little to be attractive  to depositors;  the maturity and other characteristics  of deposits were not adjusted
to the inflationary  post-independence  economic  climate. As a result, the Saving Bank became
progressively  less dominant  as an intermediary  for private saving, although  its extensive  network  of
branches  made it the sole provider of financial services  for much of the population.
V.  Conclusions  and suggested extensions.
The major conclusions  of this research  project can be summarized  as follows.
Private saving has assuredly  declined  in the period since independence  for the four
countries  considered  here.  It is necessary  to correct for the "forced  saving" of the last years of the
Soviet  regime and to recognize  that there has been substantial  saving outside  the formal financial
system since independence. However, after those corrections  the evidence  of the surveys  and official
statistics  suggests  that private saving is down.
* Private saving is greater than that observed as deposits in the banking  system. With
independence  and the sluggishness  of the state commercial  banks in adjusting  interest rates to respond
to the inflationary  episodes, alternative  financial instruments  became  more attractive  than formal
deposits. These included  holding  of foreign exchange,  self-finance  and shares in "trust companies".
Private commercial  banks eventually  offered foreign exchange-denominated  deposits to attract some of
these funds, but other forms of saving still abound.  I am unable to provide a specific  estimate  of that
alternative  saving, but I do provide evidence  of its existence  in survey results and reports from the
countries examined.
'  Private saving does respond  to the incentives  of positive real interest rates. Here it isSawng  in Transzion Fxonomie  - 29
impossible  to disaggregate  two effects: the pure saving effect and that of portfolio  allocation  of that
saving. The evidence  provided here suggests  that portfolios  have been skewed strikingly  toward those
instruments  with positive real interest rates.  It is impossible  with present data to separate
convincingly  the real interest rate effect from the "income  effect" that has led to lower saving overall,
so that I have not yet identified  the contribution  of real interest rates to the saving process. This is an
interesting  direction for future research.
The governments  of these economies  have not yet tapped effectively  the continuing  saving.
Rather, they have relied upon the use of credit creation  to finance expenditures;  this is effective  only
through stimulating extreme  inflation. Proper use of existing  private saving will require a
reconsideration  of government  policies to recognize  the true opportunity  cost of borrowed  funds, and
the offering  of either (a) debt instruments  indexed  to the exchange  rate or (b) debt instruments  with
interest rates as high as those on deposits at reputable  commercial  banks.  This step will no doubt be
coincident  with a decision to cut government  expenditures,  since use of these debt instruments  implies
a positive real cost to borrowing. It promises, however, a non-inflationary  source of deficit finance.
This research report represents  the beginning  of study of an important  question. As noted
above, there are issues not resolved  in this report; these can only be addressed with confidence  by the
amassing  and consolidating  of additional  data.  The surveys of private saving behavior  reported here
are an important  first step, and I hope that such information  will be collected  in future survey efforts.
In addition, more work on the transition in the financial  sector will be fruitful.  There is a thin line
between  the dynamic  banks and the "Ponzi"  banks, and regulation  must be sophisticated  to cull the
latter while allowing the former to thrive.  The information  of this report represents  a first step in
examining  that question.Saving in Transition &onomnie  - 30
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Table  1
Distribution of income and Expenditure in Ukraine
for the fourts quarter  of 1993,  taken  from household  budgets
Nlonthly Household  Income (in thousands  of karbovanets)
Less  than  From 120  From 160  From 200  From 240  From 300  From 400  More than
All  120  lo 160  to 200  to 240  to 300  to 400  to 600  600
Total  Income  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100  100
Wages  (of public
and private sectors)  58.5  60.3  60.3  60.1  62.0  59.9  59.5  57.9  55.8
Pensions,  stipends
andgifts  16.9  23.8  21.5  20.0  18.4  18.3  17.1  16.1  11.5
Sale  of products  19.7  15.6  18.0  18.4  18.4  19.0  19.1  20.5  22.6
Income  from other
sources  4.9  0.3  0.2  1.5  1.2  2.8  4.3  5.5  10.1
Expenditures
(as a share  of income)
Foodstuffs  57.4  87.9  75.4  71.0  66.5  62.2  57.4  51.2  38.0
Other goods  20.1  11.9  13.1  16.8  16.1  17.6  19.8  21.6  29.3
Alcoholic beverages  2.5  1.2  1.9  2.1  2.6  2.5  2.5  2.7  2.6
Commtunal  services  2.1  2.2  2.3  2.0  2.0  2.0  1.8  1.7  1.5
Other services  3.9  4.0  4.6  4.2  4.5  4.4  4.1  4.3  3.4
Taxes  5.5  4.0  4.6  4.9  4.7  5.3  5.6  6.1  5.9
Other expenses  3.5  3.3  1.9  2.5  2.6  3.1  3.8  4.4  4.1
Saving (as  residual)  5.0  -14.5  -3.8  -3.5  1.0  2.9  5.0  8.0  15.2
Memorandum:  Less  than  $4.70  - $6.27 - $7.84  - $9.40 - $11.76 - $15.68  - More than
US dollar equivalent  $4.70  6.27  $7.84  $9.40  $11.76  $15.68  $23.52  $23.52
on 15  November  in informal market
Source: Ministry of Statistics;  data  collection network.SaWng  In TrwiAo  &emlea-  - 33
Table 2
Real Interest  Rates in Ukraine
Average interest rate minus observed inflation  rate
Refinance  Commercial  Deposits
l________  Credits  Credits
1993  January  -41.1  -40.8  -41.5
February  -22.4  -18.8  -19.1
March  -13.8  -10  -11.2
April  -10.8  -8.2  -10.1
May  -1.2  -7.7  -1.9
June  -26.0  -20.4  -24.2
July  -19.1  -8.1  -8.0
__________  August  -19.0  -9.4  -11.5
_________  September  -36.8  -28.5  -30.4
October  -37.1  -29.7  -32.7
November  -26.7  -11.6  -14.5 !__________  December  -32.9  -24.7  -28.7
1994  January  -7.3  5.6  -0.4
February  _  6.6  17.3  9.9
March  13.3  25.4  20.5
April  9.9  20.1  20.2
May  10.6  19.1  16.9
Source: National  Bank of UkraneS.i*g  in Tr'l*W  Ecov-ner - 34
Table 3a
Mometasy  Survey  for Georgia
(As percent  of Domestic  Credit)
DEC 1991  DEC 1992  JAN 1993 FEB 1993  MAR 1993  APR 1993  MAY 1993  JUN 1993 JUL 1993 AUG 1993  SEP 1993 OCT 1993  NOV 1993  DEC 1993
Net Foreign  Assets  0.0  -94.4  -66.0  -67.6  -62.7  44.9  -51.6  -36.2  -29.4  -21.7  1.3  -11.9  2.5  13.5
Convertible  assets  0.0  1.9  2.2  2.5  2.3  1.9  5.5  6.3  6.1  5.9  25.9  16.8  19.5  23.6 Russian  ruble  assets  0.0  -96.3  -68.2  -70.1  -65.0  -46.8  -57.1  -42.5  -35.6  -27.6  -24.6  -28.7  -17.0  -10.0
NetDomesticAssets  73.1  140.4  105.3  112.8  92.7  75.7  96.5  94.1  96.6  91.5  87.7  94.5  84.5  71.9 - - --  - - --  - - .. ,.  . . --  --  --  - - _  _  - -.  - - --  -.  -_--  - --  --  --  --  - --  --  - --  --  - --  -
Domestic  Credit  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 Claims  on General  govemment  7.6  14.9  22.5  9.3  6.2  4.2  6.7  7.0  2.4  5.9  8.2  10.0  12.5  23.3 Claims  on rest  of the economy  92.4  85.1  77.5  90.7  93.8  95.8  93.3  93.0  97.6  94.1  91.8  90.0  87.5  76.7 o/w claims  on entcrpfises  77.3  64.5  56.8  58.4  69.2  70.5  58.7  57.0  59.5  56.4  61.7  60.8  65.7  61.7
Other Assets  (net)  -26.9  40.4  5.3  12.8  -7.2  -24.3  -3.5  -5.9  -3.4  -8.5  -12.3  -5.5  -15.5  -28.1
Broad Money  73.1  46.1  39.3  45.2  30.1  32.1  44.9  57.9  67.2  69.8  89.0  82.6  87.1  85.4
Broad money  (coupon-denominated)  73.1  45.2  38.8  44.5  28.9  31.4  41.7  53.9  64.0  65.8  64.7  66.6  58.3  48.7 o/w Currency  outside  banks  34.9  16.8  13.4  13.0  7.7  10.9  11.3  23.8  31.6  31.5  33.4  37.3  33.2  22.0 o/w Banking  deposits  38.2  28.5  25.4  31.5  21.1  20.5  30.5  30.1  32.4  34.3  31.3  29.3  25.1  26.7 Banking  deposits  in foreign  currency  0.0  0.8  0.5  0.8  1.2  0.7  3.2  4.0  3.3  4.0  24.3  16.0  28.8  36.8
Meitorandum items:
Domestic  credit  (billions of coupons)  17.7  158  211  234  402  478  444  515  543  648  858  1305  1934  3769 Domenstic  credit (monthly  growth rate)  795.5  33.1  11.0  71.9  18.9  -7.0  15.9  5.4  19.4  32.4  52.0  48.3  94.9
Source: National  Bank  of Georgia
*  - Annual growth rateSawng  in Tasdtion Bconomies - 35
Table 3b
Monetary Survey for Georgia
(As Percent of Domestic Credit)
JAN 1994  FEB 1994  MAR 1994  APR 1994  MAY 1994  JUN 1994  JUL 1994  AUG 1994
Net Foreign Assets  26.5  17.9  11.2  -16.7  -18.7  -26.2  -24.3  -25.1
Convertible assets  29.1  20.0  12.0  -16.6  -18.6  -26.0  -24.2  -25.1 Russian ruble assets  -2.7  -2.1  -0.8  -0.1  -0.1  -0.2  -0.1  -0.0
Net Domestic Assets  78.1  90.9  79.5  82.2  91.3  92.4  96.4  89.7
Domestic  Credit  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0 Claims on General government  14.0  15.7  13.5  6.2  8.6  6.0  9.0  6.4 Claims on rest of the economy  86.0  84.3  86.5  93.8  91.4  94.0  91.0  93.6 o/wclaims on enterprises  71.8  68.4  72.5  82.1  76.9  81.8  79.0  85.9
Other Assets (net)  -21.9  -9.1  -20.5  -17.8  -8.7  -7.6  -3.6  -10.3
Broad Money  104.5  108.8  90.7  65.6  72.7  66.2  72.1  64.5
Broad money (coupon-denominated)  41.7  39.6  30.2  17.1  27.4  23.3  26.3  18.3 o/w Currency in circulation  17.5  15.5  8.9  3.3  4.3  3.7  3.6  3.6 olw Banking deposits  24.2  24.1  21.3  13.7  23.0  19.6  22.7  14.7 Banking deposits in foreign currency  51.3  47.8  49.6  42.9  36.6  34.2  30.7  38.8 Balances on banks' correspondent  accounts  11.6  21.4  10.9  5.6  8.7  8.7  15.1  7.4
Memorandum items:
Domestic credit (billions of coupons)  4708  5870  11438  38573  39701  50138  60209  113172 Domestic credit (monthly growth rate)  24.9  24.7  94.9  237.2  2.9  26.3  20.1  88.0
Source:  National Bank of GeorgiaSaWng  in 7&uLWon  Ech  ni4&  - 36
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1  - y  .. g+j# 0 Y 1.g+#(P)  y  Lg+16(pSavng  in TranultJ  ECnMie,  - 37
Figure 2
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Figure 3
Comparative Dynamics of a Negative Production Shock
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Figure 4
Household  Sources  and Uses of Purchasing  Power
(on a monthly  basis)
Sources  Uses
Total income  Expenditures  on consumer  goods
Formal wage and/or salary
Sale  of produce  or livestock  Expenditures  on communal  services
Private trading or business activity
Rental of land or property  Business  expenditures
Interest from loans given
Pensions  or other government  payments  Deposits in banks or other financial
Gifts from family and/or friends  institutions
Sale  of possessions  Holdings  of currency (domestic  or
foreign)
Borrowing,  withdrawal  from bank accounts  or use of
hoarded  currency  Capital  purchases
Receipt  of previously  loaned fundsSaWng  in Transidon  &onomdes  -40
Figure 5
Asset-holding  and the "Ruble Overhang" in the Soviet Union
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Figure 6
Currency Holdings and Deposits of the Population in Belarus
in 1989  rubles
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Figure 7
Ratio of Banking  System  Financial  Instruments  to Cash in Ukraine
|Ukraine:  Trends in Saving Activity 
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Figure 8
Yield Curve  and Concentration  of Deposits  in Banking  System  in Ukraine
Ukraine:  Deposits in Banking System [Distribution  and Interest Rates on Deposits, May 1994











less than I  I to 3  3 to 6  6 to 12  Over 12
Maturity  of deposit (in months)
[Source: National  Bank of UkraineAnnex A
Theoretical specification  of saving in the transition.
The theory of private saving is best viewed  as an intertemporal  choice for the allocation  of
real resources.  In this section I begin  with a two-period  model to illuminate  the basic economic
forces determining  private saving. I then turn to an extension  of the framework  in which the dynamic
of transition is explicitly  derived.
The two-period  model.
The private sector will be modeled as equating  the present value of expenditure  over the two
periods to the present value of after-tax  income and the wealth carried forward from the past.  This
budget constraint can be written as
E(p,1,u)  =  0  (1)
0 = p(D - t) + Y
E =  pc'  +  C 2
y  = py'(Ca)  +  y2
E is the present value of expenditure  (here, simply consumption)  in the two periods, and has the usual
properties of expenditure  functions.'  Consumption  in period two (c 2) is taken as the numeraire,
while consumption  in period one (c') has a relative  price p.2  The level of utility achieved  through
this pattern of expenditure  is denoted  u.  D is the inherited  wealth, while Y is the present  value of
income in both periods and t is a lump-sum  tax paid in period one. 27 a represents  the possibility of
an income shock in period one.
The material balance in the period-one  consumption  good is then
c'  +  g -Y'  =  (2)
The government  has its own expenditures  (g) in period one that are not necessarily  financed
completely  out of taxation receipts and contribute  nothing  to utility. ,  is the volume of international
borrowing (i.e., the negative  of the current account  surplus)  undertaken  by the households.
International  lenders are assumed  to have a positive  p-elasticity  of international  borrowing, with the
volume of available financing rising with p. 2S
5 The convention  in the following  will be that derivatives  are indicated  by subscript while time
periods are indicated  by superscript.
I  This relative price  is the amalgamn  of the ratio of price levels in the two periods and the
nominal discount factor R =  (1  +r); i.e., p = P'R/P 2 where superscripts indicate  periods.
1  I assume for simplicity  that no taxes are levied (and no govermnent  expenditures  made) in
period two.
2  Rising p indicates  that the real interest rate that the home country  pays on international  debt is
rising.  This specification  was chosen  to provide a parameterization  of two extreme  cases: an
economy  with unlimited access  to world capital markets  at given price p' (infinite  p-elasticity)  and an
economy  with no access to world capital  markets (zero p-elasticity). Those special cases are derived
directly in Annex C.Sawng  in Transidton  ononmies  Annex  - ii
Saving of the households  in period one is defined as
s =  Y, - cT  - T  (3)
and as combination  of (2) and (3) indicates  is identical in equilibrium  to the difference  of the
government  budget  deficit (g-T)  and foreign borrowing  s.  There are thus three sets of determinants  to
real saving. The first is the government  fiscal policy, as summarized  by the fiscal deficit. The
second comprises  shocks  to earnings  capacity, as indicated  by the shock a to period-one  product.
The third is the relative price (or real interest rate) p.  While the first two are exogenous,  the third is
jointly determined  with real saving; I examine  this joint determination  in the following  sections.
Equilibrium in the two-period model.
The determinants  of real saving and the real interest rate p can be derived from total
differentiations  of the equation  system (1) through (3).  Through appropriate  substitution,  this
derivation  yields the following  solution  in terms of endogenous  variables  p and u.
Define y =  (cO-y'-fl-D+T), and assume that it is positive in equilibrium  (i.e., that the
economy  will have excess demand  for goods in period one).  Define as well a  (EP 1 JE,) as the
marginal  propensity  to consume  in period one from discounted  wealth 0 and X  =  G8 - Ep) >  0 the
increase in availability  of period-one  resources  to the government  budget  through real interest rate
increase.  Then
=  (1/a)  1  dD
E..du  _  _y+pq  -p  ,  Y' da_
A  =  be  + n  >  j
The relative price of period-one  goods is rising (either through an increase in P' or an
increase  in R)  with an increase  in g or D and a decrease in r.  A shock a that tends to reduce
period-one  income also has this effect for non-extreme  values of p.  The shifts in g, r and a all limit
the quantity  of goods available  for consumption  in period one, and thus raise the relative  price of
those goods. The stock D represents  a claim by consumers  on the existing  stock of goods based on
previous  saving, and an increase  in that stock will increase  demand and thus the relative price of
period-one  goods. The multiplier  term A is positive by the assumption  of excess demand for period-
one consumption  (,yb)  and due to the positive effects  of real interest rate rises in causing  domestic
saving (the Slutsky  substitution  effect -Epp)  and increased  foreign borrowing  (a).
Utility is falling with an increase in g or r; government  expenditure  is not valued in the utility
function  but crowds  out private consumption,  while taxes subtract directly  from disposable  income.
I  By definition  E(l,p,u) =  D. It is also the case that in equilibrium  the Slutsky and Marshallian
demand curves coincide. For period-one  consumption,  that implies Ep(p,l,u) = c'(p,).
Differentiation  of these two equalities  for constant  p yields E. =  Du  and E,  =  cQ  0k.. Substitution
and rearrangement  yields EpF,E.  = cQ,  as was to be shown.Saing  in Trondizion  Economdes  ANer  - id
A negative shock to period-one  output causes a fall in utility as well.  Utility is increasing  in wealth
carried forward.
Real saving behavior as defined  in this macroeconomic  context  can be derived from equations
(3) and (4).
ds  =  y'  dct - Ep dp - 5 E. du - dr
=  (1-(6SpA))  dg - (l/A)pb#p dD - (1 - (pS6,BpI))  dT - (1 - (l-pb)1,B/A)  y'  dot  (5)
Real saving is rising with an increase in g, although  not in a one-for-one  manner if foreign  borrowing
is possible.  It is falling with an increase in the accumulated  stock of wealth and rising with an
increase in real taxation. It is falling with negative  output  shocks in period one.'
Modelling saving in the dynamic transition.
Life-cycle  models of consumption,  investment  and saving over an infinite  horizon  provide a
convenient  starting point for the theoretical  model. The optimal  behavior in Campbell  (1987) or
Blanchard  and Fischer (1989)  can be summarized  in the notation  of the previous section, with
conditions  introduced  to govern the adjustment  of nominal  price and the stock of financial assets over
time:
D t =  (l+r)  D'I  +  PI s'  (6)
St=  y - c  - t(7)
Pt =  P-' +  4)  [ (gt  t t) - st - B(p t)J  (8)
The stock of financial assets rises with interest paid to holders and with the value of private saving in
the period.  The net material balance  condition  (2) may not hold in flow equilibrium, allowing  for
the possibility  of rationing in periods of excess demand. This excess demand  is a function  the
government  deficit and the volume of foreign borrowing  f(pt).`  As equation (8) indicates,  such
excess demand  will cause price inflation;  the limiting case, as X approaches  infinity, is that of net
material balance.
x  This last effects  are not ambiguous,  and provide an interesting  contrast  with the impact  of
increased  government  expenditure. All increase  the excess demand  in the goods market in period
one, but the government's marginal  propensity  to consume  in period one is unity.  Given the private
marginal  propensity  of 6, the impact of the output shock or taxation  effect is reduced and can be
reversed for extremely  high valuations  of period-one  relative price p.
31  The equation of motion for foreign  debt is subsumed  in the asset accumulation  equation, and
the nominal interest rate is the same on foreign and domestic  borrowing. These assumptions  could be
relaxed, but at the cost of modeling  the evolution  of international  debt separately.SaWg i  2wisidon Ectomies  Anne  . -iv
Expansion of this equation system  and evaluation at net material  balance (with stable price P)
yields the following matrix equation system:
rDt  - DtI  r - P' (Oc t/OD")  (gt  - t' - t)  - PS  (act/aP t')  D' I  (9)
LP-  1*1  L e(lCl8D)'-)  (a-  L-#P(P'))  P  (
Consumption is assumed to respond to price  and financial-asset stocks as in the two-period case, with
(ac tIaDl))  >  0 and  (act 8P'-?)  <  0.  The former  condition is derived from the marginal propensity to
consume from an increase in purchasing power  0, ceteris paribus,  while the second stems from the
impact of nominal price increases on the purchasing power of nominal financial assets.  The effect of
D includes both its direct impact and its indirect impact through the change in the relative
intertemporal price of goods p'.
The trace and determinant of the matrix indicate the saddlepoint nature of the equilibrium to
this dynamic system. 32 It is illustrated in Figure 2 of the text.
3  The trace of this dynamic system is r - P  (ac/8D'l))  +  (ac t/lP"  - #),  and this will be negative
for lower values of r.  The determinant of the system is 44r (8c t/aP'1 - #P) - (g' - t<  - (8c tI8D>')] C
0 always.  These signs will assure a saddlepoint-stable equilibrium.Annex B:  Survey instrument
Saving Survey - Georgia
The following  survey was prepared by Patrick Conway  and the Georgian  Center  for
Transition Economic  Systems and Sustainable  Development. It was administered  twice in the city of
Tbilisi, in August and in November 1994, to 500 heads of household. The results will be used in a
comparative  study of saving behavior in transition economies  under preparation  by Patrick Conway,
and by the Georgian  Center and the Caucasian  Institute  for Peace, Democracy  and Development  in
their periodic reports.
The heads of households  interviewed  were selected  according  to the following  criteria.
1.)  The proportion  of households  in the sample from each administrative  district
(raion)  of Tbilisi was set equal to the existing  population  distribution.
2.)  The proportion  of households  of certain  size (e.g., 4 members)  in the sample
was set equal to the existing  population distribution.
Given these selection  criteria, households  were selected  by random  from the population. 20
individuals trained by the CSEI conducted the first survey during the period 15 - 22 August  1994.
Demographic questions:
1.  How many individuals  reside in your household?
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 or more.
2.  How many individuals  residing in your household  have monetary  income?
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 or more
3.  In which region of Tbilisi (raion) do you live?
1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10
4.  Do you (or any members  of your household)  own your home?
Yes  No
5.  What is your gender?  Male  Female
6.  What is your age?
18-24  25-34  35-49  50-60  61 or older
7.  What is the highest level of education  you have received?
Compulsory  Technical  Training  Higher  educationSaing In Tra'adon Economies  Aner  - W
Economic  questions:
8.  Within the past month, consider  the total income  of your household.  From what sources  did the income
come?
Less than  More than
None  half  half  All
Formal salary
Sale  of agricultural  produce
or livestock
Private trading or business activity
Rental  of land or property
Interest from lending funds
Pensions  or other government  payments
Gifts from family  or friends
9.  In which of the following  ranges  does the total monthly  income of your household  lie?
Check one
Less than 1 million  coupons
Between  I million and 10 million  coupons
Between  10 milion and 20 million  coupons
Between  20 million and 30 million  coupons
Between  30 million and 50 million  coupons
Between  50 miUion  and 80 million  coupons
More than 80 million  coupons
10.  In the last month, did you sell any possessions  to obtain money?
Yes  No
11.  If yes, was the value of those possessions
Check one
Less than I miUion  coupons
Between  I million and 10 million  coupons
Between  10 milion and 20 million  coupons
Between  20 million  and 30 million  coupons
Between  30 million  and 50 million  coupons
Between  50 million  and 80 million  coupons
More than 80 million coupons
12.  In the last month, did you borrow any money,  withdraw  money  from bank deposits  or use currency  saved
at home?
Yes  No
13.  If yes, was the combined  value of these activities
Check  one
Less than I milion coupons
Between  1 million  and 10 million  coupons
Between  10 million  and 20 million  couponsSaving in  Transidon Economits  Annsx-  - vii
Between 20 million and 30 million coupons
Between 30 million and 50 million coupons
Between 50 million and 80 million coupons
More than 80 million coupons
14.  In the last month,  did you receive back any money previously lent to others?
Yes  No
15.  If yes, was the value of the returned money
Check one
Less than  1 million coupons
Between 1 million and  10 million coupons
Between 10 million and 20 million coupons
Between 20 million and 30 million coupons
Between 30 million and 50 million coupons
Between 50 million and 80 million coupons
More than 80 million coupons
16.  For the last month, add together the total of those sources of funds described above -- income, sale of
possessions, borrowing,  reduction of bank deposits, use of accumulated currency, and return of previously lent
money.  Of this total,  how much was used on each of the following?
Food expenditures  None  Less than half  More than half  All
Housing rental  None  Less than half  More than half  All
Clothing expenditures  None  Less than half  More than half  All
Communal services  None  Less than half  More than half  All
Entertainment expenses  None  Less than half  More than half  All
Business expenses  None  Less than half  More than half  All
Deposits in banks and
trust companies  None  Less than half  More than half  All
Holdings in currency
(coupons or other)  None  Less than half  More than half  All
Large purchases (autos,
houses, refrigerators,
and others)  None  Less than half  More than half  All
17.  For the last month, add together the total of those sources of funds described above --  income, sale of
possessions, borrowing,  reduction of bank deposits, use of accumulated currency, and return of previously lent
money.  Of this total, what percentage was used on each of the following:
Food expenditures  None  0-20  20-40 40-60  60-80 80-100  All
Housing rental  None  0-20  20-40 40-60  60-80  80-100  All
Clothing expenditures  None  0-20  20-40 40-60  60-80  80-100  All
Communal services  None  0-20  20-40 40-60  60-80 80-100  All
Entertainmentexpenses  None  0-20  20-40 40-60  60-80  80-100  All
Business expenses  None  0-20  20-40 40-60  60-80  80-100  All
Deposits in banks and
trust companies  None  0-20  20-40 40-60  60-80 80-100  All
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(coupons  or other)  None 0-20  20-40 40-60  60-80 80-100  All
Large purchases (autos,
houses, refrigerators
and others)  None  0-20  20-40  40-60  60-80 80-100  All
18.  Do you expect the past month to be similar to this month economically?
Yes  No
19.  During the past month, did anyone in your household receive funds (income, borrowing,  exchange) in
foreign currency(rubles,  dollars or other)?
Yes  No
20.  How much of your household funds came in the form of foreign currency?
None  Less than half  More than half  All
21.  Your household used this foreign currency in what way?
No  Partial Use  Primary Use  All
Spent on goods and services
Held at home as saving
Placed in bank deposit




Profiles of Formal Financial Institutions in Belarus, Georgia,
Kazakhstan and Ukraine
In the course of this research project I interviewed  a number  of officials  with commercial
banks in Belarus, Georgia,  Kazakhstan  and Ukraine. The text of the report summarizes  the
conclusions  I reached based upon these interviews,  but the details of the financial  sectors and banking
operation in these countries may be of independent  interest. For this purpose I include below short
summaries  of the financial  sectors of the various countries  and the operations  of specific  commercial
banks. For each country  the section on banking operations  begins with a description  of the successor
bank to the Soviet Saving Bank, given the historical  monosony  of this institution  in attracting  saving.
Belarus.
In Belarus  the bifurcation  in financial  markets was strongly in evidence. The markets in
zaichik (the national  currency, de facto) in mid-1994  were a channel  for distributing  directed credits
to favored industrial  and agricultural  borrowers. 33 These credits did not represent intermediation  of
private saving, but rather a claim on the National Bank of Belarus  (NBB). Markets in foreign
exchange  also appeared,  with the private commercial  banks  taking the lead in these activities.
Lending  volumes  depended  upon the prior attraction of foreign-exchange  deposits, and banks were
thus more competitive  in seeking  those depositors.
The state commercial  banks, especially  Agroprombank  and Promstroibank,  were the prime
channels  for distribution  of these directed credits. Agroprombank  in mid-1994  relied upon NBB  or
budgetary  refinancing  for over 75 percent of its resources, while time deposits (including  foreign
exchange  deposits)  represented  only about 10 percent of resources. Promstroibank  was less reliant on
these governrment  refinancings,  but very dependent  upon the correspondent  balances  of industrial
enterprises  held at miniscule  nominal interest rates.  Promstroibank  did offer some foreign-exchange
credits, but these were typically  refinanced  through foreign lines of credit arranged  by foreign
exporters  or joint-venture  partners.
Private commercial  banks were also able to refinance  credits with the NBB  in mid-1994.
Thus, the most successful  banks were not necessarily  specialized  in foreign-exchange  transactions.
For example,  Priorbank was roughly equally split in value between  zaichik  and foreign-exchange
transactions  at the beginning  of 1994. It obtained a significant  share of zaichik funds through NBB
refinancing  but sought the rest through interbank borrowing  and enterprise  deposits deposits  of zaichik
or foreign currency.  Belarus  Bank, by contrast, specialized  almost completely  in foreign-exchange
credits and deposits.
The Saving Bank of Belarus  was rather slow to respond  to the changing  economic  climate, in
part because it remained  a state-controlled  institution. In mid-1994  it continued  to offer only zaichik-
denominated  deposits, with interest rates much below the inflation  rate.  Deposits did increase  five
times in nominal  terms over 1993, but the consumer  price index  had increased  20 times in the same
period. Foreign-exchange  deposits were under preparation  at that time, nearly a year after competing
'3  The local currency  at that time was de jure a ruble supplement,  exchangeable  at par for
Russian  rubles.  There was de facto a large premium on Russian  rubles in this exchange,  especially  in
non-cash  transactions. The ruble supplement  was known in Belarus  as the "zaichik",  or rabbit,
because  that animal  is pictured on the 1-ruble  supplement.Saving in  Transiton  Economues Annex  - x
banks had begun these operations. The Saving Bank activities  remained  constrained  by governmental
regulation. For example,  40 percent of Saving Bank deposits by law were to be relent for housing
construction  at an annual interest rate of 140  percent.  The borrower paid 10 percentage  points of
this, while the government  was to reimburse  the Saving Bank for the balance. Not only was this
lending  rate well below inflation, but the government  was typically  not prompt in its reimbursements.
This greatly constrained  the interest rate the Saving Bank could offer on deposits.
The structure of interest rates on deposits in Belarus  underwent  some adjustment  in 1993.
Table Cl
Interest Rates on Deposits at the Saving Bank in Belarus
(in percent)
Maturity of deposit  July 1993  January 1994
Sight deposit  20  60
One month time deposit  40  160
Three month time deposit  40  190
Six month time deposit  40  240
One year time deposit  40  250
Three-five  year time deposits  50
More than five year deposits  60
Source: Saving Bank
Historically,  the Saving Bank lent large volumes  of its funds to the National Bank of Belarus
(NBB)  and the Ministry of Finance. By mid-1994  this had almost  disappeared,  with no borrowing by
the Ministry of Finance, and only small amounts  by the NBB. An April 1994 decree of the presidium
of Supreme  Soviet governed  this.  There were no other government-directed  loans, but the NBB  did
require reserve holdings of between 10 and 12 percent of deposit  volume  to be held at the NBB.
In mid-1994  the Saving Bank was just preparing to introduce  foreign  exchange  deposits.  It
expected  to fill a niche in the market, for commercial  banks required  a minimum  balance  of $300 for
such deposits; the Saving Bank had no such minimum  balance. The interest rate was projected  to be
6 percent annually. The details remaining  included  the receipt of a license  to trade foreign exchange
from Belvnesheconombank  and the building  up of foreign exchange  reserves.
Georgia.
In Georgia  the bifurcation  of financial  markets was quite far advanced,  and the financial
intermediaries  had for the most part chosen to specialize  in one or the other currency. The market
for deposits and credits in the domestic  currency, or menati, was stagnant  in mid-1994  except for the
credits refinanced  by the National Bank of Georgia  (NBG). The Agroprombank  and the
Promstroibank  (here known as the Industriabank)  were channels  for distribution  of these credits;SaWng  In Tra,fsion Economisc Amnna  - xi
Industriabank  had branched as well into foreign-exchange  transactions.
In October 1994 there were 250 commercial  banks licensed by the NBG for operation in
Georgia. Most of these were in operation on only a limited scale, and may have been the "in-house"
bank for a firm or group of firms.  Of the total, only the five state commercial  banks and perhaps 10
others were considered  active in soliciting  banking  deposits and clients for lending. The NBG was at
that time involved  in an effort to tighten restrictions  upon these intermediaries.
The New Georgian  Bank (the Georgian  name for the Saving Bank) remained  a state bank until
mid-1994. Its deposits  less than doubled  in nominal terms during the first half of 1994  despite a ten-
fold increase in consumer  prices, due in part to a nominal interest rate of 150 percent per annum  on
those deposits. With privatization  in July 1994 it began its transformation  into a full-service  banking
system. 50 enterprises  per day become  depositors. It has correspondent  banks throughout  Europe,
and is presently searching  for a European  partner in a joint venture in international  banking. Foreign
exchange  departments  were put in place in all affiliates  and the bank accepted  foreign-exchange  (US
dollar, not Russian  ruble) deposits. The rate on these deposits was seemingly  not very competitive,
however, since the bank experienced  a drop in deposits in mid-1994  as it lowered its return to 3
percent per month.
Private commercial  banks have left the menati financial  markets nearly entirely. For
example,  Ivertbank  in mid-1994  had accepted  deposits from individuals  split among  Russian  rubles
and dollars in a 9:1 ratio.  Ruble deposits  received  a 5 percent/month  interest rate.  US dollar 3-
month time deposits earned 3 percent per month. There was solid growth (roughly  20 percent) in
dollar deposits during the first half of 1994. These funds were loaned  out at interest rates of roughly
10 percent per month for trading transactions. The TBC Bank, a member of the TBC Group,
operated in a similar manner.  Of deposits, only 20 percent of the total is found in coupons,  with 60
percent in US dollars and 20 percent in Russian rubles and German marks.  The bank's lending
occurs almost exclusively  in US dollars.  The imbalance  between  coupon (or ruble) deposits and
lending  is rectified by immediate  conversion  of coupon (or ruble) to US dollars on the auction  or
bazaar markets. Both banks have limited resources, as deposit volume is not large, but were
demonstrating  positive growth at a time of depression  elsewhere  in the economy. Other banks, such
as Kerdsobank,  have chosen a strategy  of specialization  in menati  transactions,  but these are not
exhibiting  rapid growth.
Trust companies  were very visible alternatives  to depositors  in Georgia. A large number of
these companies  were in evidence  at the end of 1993, but most failed in mid-1994  with the failure  of
the MMM  corporation in Moscow.'  Others continued  through to the end of 1994, but these failed in
turn.  Depositors  and shareholders  placed great pressure on the government  to provide ex post
guarantees  for their funds, pointing to involvement  by government  agencies  and officials  in the
organization  and management  of some of these. These companies  solicited  US dollar deposits
offering  24 percent interest per month. They apparently  had lined up loans backing trade that could
offer 100 percent per month. Unfortunately,  these loans often failed, and so also did the trust
companies..
3'  These were not linked financially. However, Georgian  depositors in such companies  lost faith
after observing the MMM difficulties  and demanded  their deposits returned. This "run on the trust
company"  led to closures in Georgia  as well.Saving in Transition Economies  Annex- - xii
The first wave of trust companies  (including  Achi, Golden Fish, Geico and others) attracted
clients with the promise of - and initial success in returning -- 20 percent return per  month on
deposits. Some of these may have been pure "Ponzi" schemes,  but others were financial
intermediaries  with ties to corporations  able to turn high short-term  profits through trading operations.
These organizations  were able to offer such high returns because  of the profits from trading activities
and because  the deposits were loaned out completely  -- negligible  reserves were held for repurchase
of deposit certificates.  The success  of these corporations  attracted competitors,  both from newly
created  trust companies  and from more aggressive  commercial  banks. The cash flow from receipts
and repayments  of lending was sufficient  to cover withdrawals  until the failure of the Russian  firm
MMM. During the time of the MMM crisis in Moscow, depositors  in Tbilisi approached  these trust
companies  to redeem their certificates. The trust company  was typically  unable to meet these
demands,  and was forced to close.
These failures were liquidity-driven. Subsequent  failures were related  to insolvency,  and
occurred in one of two ways.  The first was through theft:  for example,  the Golden Bowl
Corporation  failed in October 1994 when the chairman  fled the country  (reportedly  with $60 million).
The second was through ineptitude. Here, the case of Innovation  Bank is instructive. This bank was
backed  by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and offered  high interest rates on deposits. The leaders of
the bank made a number  of improper  loans, including  a US $400,000  loan to a woman friend, while
paid-in capital  was valued at less than a tenth of that.  Most loans were made to the founders  of the
Bank. Each borrower proposed a productive  use for the loan, but these were not well thought  out
and not well screened  by the bank.  The bank was warned about its behavior  a number  of times by
NBG before it finally failed.
Depositors  have been quite vocal in demanding  that the government  make restitution  for the
losses in these trust companies. In part, this demand is due to the understandable  desire of investors
to recoup an investment  gone sour.  It is also the case, however, that many of these failed companies
had close  ties with government  agencies;  in some cases (like Innovation  Bank)  the government  agency
was a part owner.
Kankhstan.
The banking system of Kazakhstan  had its beginnings  in 1987  with the "break-up"  of the
Gosbank  and the passage of a new law on corporations. The Almaty  Cooperative  Bank in 1988
received  the fourth banking license issued in the Soviet  Union. By mid-1994  there were over 200
banks in Kazakhstan. 35 of these were private, while the remainder  were joint-stock corporations. 35
Four that had begun as specialized  state banks -- Turanbank  (previously  Promstroibank),
Agroprombank,  Narodnyibank  (previously  Saving Bank)  and Credsotsbank  -- were joint stock
companies  with the government retaining  part of the stock.  There were also 9 banks with partial
foreign ownership.
The bifurcation  of financial  markets has occurred in Kazakhstan  as well.  However, as in
Belarus, the most successful  banks are participating  in both markets. In the tenge market (the
national currency),  funds were obtained  predominantly  through sale of capital, founders' deposits and
either credit auctions or the refinancing  of directed  credits with the National  Bank of Kazakhstan
35 Cooperatives  have fallen from favor, so the cooperatives  have been converted  to joint-stock
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(NBK). Tenge deposits  were in general an unprofitable  way to obtain funds.  For small banks
(mainly those created  since independence)  there was an insufficient  network of offices to attract
deposits.  For most there was only one office - in Almaty -- and for some there were no offices at
all.  In that situation attraction  of deposits from the population  became  almost impossible. For large
banks (mainly  the specialized  state banks Agroprom,  Turan and Kredsots)  the deposits of the
population were unprofitable  and undesirable.  Despite  their network of offices, the cost of funding
through NBK refinancing  fell below that of attracting  many small depositors.  Further, these banks
were also aware  that the directed  credits were extended  to many essentially  bankrupt producers. If
the banks attracted their own deposits, they would be pressed to lend those as well to these
corporations,  and thus could  not protect the funds of the depositors. The NBK was not unhappy with
this outcome. Keeping  all banks dependent  upon them for funds allowed  them to supervise and
organize the banking  system.  Only at Narodnyibank  were deposits a primary source of tenge funds.
Non-bank  financial institutions  stepped  into the breach and solicited  deposits from the
population  for trading activities. They promised  a large return on investment. These activities  were
popular with investors  but poorly monitored. These included  trust companies, Lombard  companies,
pension funds and investment  funds.6 The government  was unsure how to handle these new
businesses,  since legislation  did not at that time provide the government  with the ability either to
regulate the new businesses  or to obtain data from those businesses. For example, Smagulov  and
Company  was a private firm offering  600 percent annual interest on tenge "deposits"  throughout
1994. The firm delivered  as promised in the earlier months, and by August 1994 a "large share of
the population" wishes  to place money  with it.  In one case, people waited in line 3 days to make
their deposits. The people liked the return, and also liked the fact that the agreements  were in effect
1-month  deposits.  Unfortunately,  Smagulov  and Company  closed  its doors in late 1994, without
repaying principal  or interest on current  balances. Smagulov  was reportedly in Australia  at the end of
1994.
Narodnyi Bank became  a joint-stock  company in May 1994 after a history as a state-run bank.
Changes  in banking  policy were not evident in August 1994, however. Interest rates had not been
adjusted since January 1994 (see Table C2).  The minimum-maturity  time deposit was one year. The
bank did not have a license  to trade foreign exchange. There were many plans for improvements  --
short-term deposits, foreign-currency  deposits, and higher interest rates on deposits to name a few -
but none was in place.
Deposits of individuals  with Narodnyi Bank and the commercial  banks rose 58 percent in
nominal terms from the beginning  of 1994  until I June 1994, from 202.5 million tenge to 320.8
million tenge. However, the inflation  rate during that same period was 266 percent, indicating  a
large fall in the real value of accumulated  tenge deposits. As of I July 1994, the volume of tenge
deposits at Narodnyi Bank was 1.15 billion tenge, while there were only .3 billion tenge at all other
conunercial  banks combined. However, from the beginning  of the year the commercial  banks have
been more successful  at attracting new deposits: there was a 58 percent increase in all deposits  and a
19 percent increase in deposits at Narodnyi Bank.
In early 1994 the NBK introduced  a less expansionary  credit policy.  Less credit was directed
to state enterprises  and refinanced  by the NBK. A greater share of credit was distributed through
3  A Lombard company  runs on pawnshop  principles.Saving in  Transiuon  Economies  Annev - -xiv
NBK auction, often with consequently  higher interest rate.  This made reliance upon NBK funds less
attractive  to commercial  banks, and they began  to solicit household  and enterprise  deposits. In mid-
1994, commercial  banks accepted  deposits in both tenge and fbreign  exchange. The latter were more
popular with commercial  banks.
The dynamic  banks in Kazakhstan  could be characterized  in mid-1994  in two ways. First,
they transacted  not only in tenge but in foreign exchange. The latter attracted depositors  wishing to
minimize  the risk from unanticipated  inflation.  The second major difference  was the interest rate on
deposits. On 1 January 1994, Narodnyi Bank offered deposit rates of 60 percent (for sight deposit)
to 250 percent (for children's deposits, maturity 10 years) per annum. Kazcommertsbank  offered
rates of 230 - 550 percent per annum on deposits.  Alataubank  offered 188 percent per annum. Only
Kazcommertsbank  of the three offered  foreign-exchange  deposits in July 1994, and the 35 percent per
annum return on those deposits  represented an extremely  positive real interest rate.
Ukraine.
The financial  system in mid-1994  in Ukraine illustrated  the strains of transition from extreme
inflation  to a more moderate  price environment. There were two markets in existence. The majority
of transactions  remained  denominated  in karbovanets  (national  currency), although  foreign-exchange
transactions  were ubiquitous. In the market for karbovanets  instruments  the interest rates on deposits
and credits reflected  the more-inflationary  environment  of 1993; in real terms these interest rates were
extremely  high, given the rapid decline  in inflation  from hyperinflationary  rates.
The successful  commercial  banks were transacting  in both currencies. Inko Bank, for
example,  was the largest private commercial  bank in Ukraine when measured  by number of branches,
assets, liabilities  or profits.  It accepted  deposits in both karbovanets  and US dollars.  On its
karbovanets  deposits, it offered in mid-1994  very short maturities (as little as 2 weeks)  with
annualized  interest rates of 150 - 200 percent.  With US dollar deposits, the interest rates were 6
percent per annum for small amounts  up to 24 percent per annum for amounts  greater than $10
million. In mid-1994  enterprises  made 78 percent of deposits in the bank, with private persons
making  the other 22 percent. The share of enterprise deposits in karbovanets  is greater than the share
in US dollars, with private deposits  just the reverse.
Agiobank, a medium-sized  bank, thrived by specializing  in the offering  of karbovanets
deposits to individuals.  It was ranked  second in deposits  to Otshadbank  (Saving  Bank) in mid-1994,
with its success attributable  to the variety of deposit instruments  it created. For example,  it was the
first bank to introduce  high-yield  certificates  of deposits in the form of bearer bonds (in April 1993).
It also introduced  door-to-door  salespeople  to sell Agiobank  instruments  to enterprises. Finally, it
began  paying crediting  interest monthly to accounts while Otshadbank  was only doing this once  per
year.  The karbovanets  deposits  of the bank remained  70 percent from the population  while 30
percent are from enterprises. Lending  in karbovanets  was 90 percent to enterprises.
Agiobank's  annual interest rates on hard currency  deposits ranged from 18 percent to 25
percent. Roughly  80 percent of total deposits are made by private individuals.  The lending  is about
50 percent to enterprises,  50 percent to individuals. Of total deposits, roughly  90 percent were in
karbovanets  with the remaining  10 percent in hard currency.SaWng  in  Trwwidon Econondies  Anne  - xv
Table C2
Narodnyl Bank
Annual Interest Rates on Deposits
Type of Deposit  Soviet  1 March  1 August  1 March  1 July  1 January
Era  1992  1992  1993  1993  1994
Demand deposits  2  3  6  15  20  60
Deposit of uncertain
maturity  3  7  14  30  40  100
Time deposit: one to
three year  5  7  14  30  40  100
Time deposit: three to
five year  7  10  20  40  50  120
Time deposit: greater than
five year  9  15  30  60  80  180
"Children  deposit" - ten
year  9  15  30  70  100  250
Annuity for auto or housing
purchase  2  5  14  30  40  100
Special accounts  7  7  7  20  20  60
Source: Narodnyi Bank, 19 July 1994
Deposit interest rates have changed  only on these days.  The types of instruments  available  had not
changed  since the Soviet period.SaWng  in Transition Economies  Annm  -x
The Otshadbank  in Ukraine  was the most innovative  successor  to the Saving Bank of those in
the countries  studied in adapting  to the post-independence  economic  climate.  It modernized  its
operations,  and could guarantee  next-day  payment to any location in Ukraine. Its technical  facilities
were the most advanced  of all the banks. For example,  all lending and depositing  operations  in the
capital  could be governed  by magnetic  card access. However, its deposit-taking  abilities were limited
by the interest rates enforced  by the National  Bank of Ukraine (NBU). On 1 July 1994  the
Otshadbank  could offer only 30 percent per annum on time deposits  of less than 6 month maturity.
Its traditional  business  had been cut way back since independence. In 1988  through 1992,  there were
roughly 250 customers  per day at each affiliate. In 1994, that average had fallen to 5-7.  Large
deposits were no longer the rule.  In the Soviet days, 8 percent of the customers  held 72 percent of
the value of Saving Bank deposits. Most accounts  in mid-1994  were very small in value.  Its
strategic  plan for 1995 was to focus upon providing  an effective  medium of payments, while leaving
deposit  and lending operations  to others. The Otshadbank  accepted  deposits in foreign  exchange  at a
3 percent annual interest rate.  It lent these funds carefully, and insisted  upon land collateral. These
deposits (at the market exchange  rate) represented  roughly 50 percent of deposits in mid-1994. 37
Il  The chief of the Kiev operations  of Saving Bank insisted  that the foreign-exchange  deposits
were "mainly  held for foreign students  in Kiev".Policy  Research  Working  Paper  Series
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